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Caught in the Intersection Between Public
Policy and Practicality:  A Survey of the
Legal Treatment of Gambling-Related
Obligations in the United States
Joseph Kelly*
I. INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL ROOTS
This article offers a survey of the law and practice of gambling
debt enforcement and recovery in the United States.  Two histori-
cal sources of law influence modern gambling debt enforcement
and recovery.  The English common law interpretation of the Stat-
ute of Anne is the first historical source;1 the second tradition
traces its roots to classical Rome.2  Both of these centuries-old tra-
ditions either severely limited or absolutely prohibited the en-
forcement of gambling debts.
England’s Statute of Anne, enacted in 1710, prohibited the en-
forcement of gambling debts3 and provided for a recovery action by
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Quirino Mancini, David Miers, Stephen Philippsohn, Marion Rodwell, Heidi Scott, Arvan
Van’t Veer, Thibault Verbiest, and Franz Wohlfhart for assistance in this article.  All mis-
takes are those of the author.
1 An Act for the Better Preventing of Excessive and Deceitful Gaming, 1710, 9 Ann. c.
14, §§ 1, 2, 4 (Eng.) [hereinafter Statute of Anne].
2 See SHELDON AMOS, THE HISTORY AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF ROME 175-
76 (1883).
3 The Statute’s first section states that all notes, securities, and so forth, executed
after May 1, 1711, for consideration of gambling or betting debts are void. Statute of Anne,
supra note 1, § 1.  The statute reads:
[F]rom and after the first day of May one thousand seven hundred and eleven, all
Notes, Bills, Bonds, Judgments, Mortgages or other Securities or Conveyances
whatsoever, given, granted, drawn or entred into, or executed by any Person or
Persons whatsoever, where the whole or any Part of the Consideration of such
Conveyances or Securities, shall be for any Money, or other valuable Thing what-
soever, won by gaming or playing at Cards, Dice, Tables, Tennis, Bowls or other
Game or Games whatsoever, or by betting on the Sides or Hands of such as do
game at any of the Games aforesaid, or for the reimbursing or repaying any Money
knowingly lent, or advanced for such gaming or betting as aforesaid, or lent or
advanced at the Time and Place of such Play, to any Person or Persons so gaming
or betting as aforesaid, or that shall, during such Play, so play or bett, shall be
utterly void, frustrate, and of none Effect, to all Intents and Purposes whatsoever;
any Statute, Law, or Usage to the contrary thereof in any wise notwithstanding
. . . .
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the losing gambler,4 or any other person on the gambler’s behalf,
for gambling debts already paid.5  The most interesting portion of
the statute lies in its recovery provisions.  The statute permitted a
bettor who lost ten pounds sterling or more to recover his loss and
costs of litigation if he brought an action within three months.6  If
the bettor failed to sue within three months, any other person
could sue to recover the bettor’s losses; however, any such recov-
ery was split equally with the parish poor where the wager oc-
curred.7  The independence of the United States rendered the
Statute of Anne relevant, but not controlling.  Therefore, each indi-
vidual state was given the freedom to choose whether to apply the
statute and its principles.  Nevertheless, the Statute of Anne has
become part of the law in a number of the states via case law or
statute.
The second legal tradition relevant to modern gambling debt
enforcement comes from classical Rome.  Roman law generally
prohibited the enforcement of gambling debts; however, it pro-
vided exceptions for bets on “manly” athletic sports, such as the
javelin, wrestling, and chariot racing, where “the subject of con-
tention was valour.”8  Roman law placed limits on the amount of
bets according to the bettor’s class status.9  Some U.S. jurisdic-
tions continue to recognize an exception for wagering based upon
skill and allow their courts to reduce the amount of the debt to a
reasonable amount for the debtor.
Id.  While the Statute of Anne was silent on an action by a winner, Blaxton v. Pye, 2 K.B.
309 (1766), barred an action by a winner to enforce a gaming debt.
4 The recovery provision states:
[A]ny Person . . . who shall . . . by playing at Cards, Dice, Tables, or other Game or
Games whatsoever, or by betting on the Sides or Hands of such as do play any of
the Games aforesaid, lose to any . . . Person . . . so playing or betting in the whole,
the Sum or Value of ten Pounds, and shall pay or deliver the same or any Part
thereof, the Person . . . losing and paying or delivering the same, shall be at Lib-
erty within three Months then next, to sue for and recover the Money or Goods so
lost, and paid or delivered or any Part thereof, from the respective Winner . . .
thereof, with Costs of Suit, by Action of Debt . . . .
Statute of Anne, supra note 1, § 2.
5 The third party recovery provision of the Statute of Anne states:
[A]nd in case the Person or Persons who shall lose such Money or other Thing as
aforesaid, shall not within the Time aforesaid, really and bona fide, and without
Covin or Collusion, sue, and with Effect prosecute for the Money or other Thing, so
by him or them lost, and paid or delivered as aforesaid, it shall and may be lawful
to and for any Person or Persons, by any such Action or Suit as aforesaid, to sue for
and recover the same, and treble the Value thereof, with Costs of Suit, against
such Winner or Winners as aforesaid; the one Moiety thereof to the Use of the
Person or Persons that will sue for the same, and the other Moiety to the Use of
the Poor of the Parish where the Offence shall be committed.
Id.
6 Id.
7 Id.
8 AMOS, supra note 2, at 175-76.
9 Id. at 176.
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The law surrounding gaming historically has been influenced
and shaped by competing “philosophical, theological, social, and
economic” beliefs.10  Those who oppose gambling point to immoral-
ity and the negative impacts on society.11  Those who support le-
galized gambling focus on the community’s need to create
economic activity and tax revenue,12 and on an individual’s free-
dom to make moral decisions.13  Modern gambling debt enforce-
ment law is a balancing act:  weighing legal tradition, conflicting
moral ideals, and economic need.  The influence of historical tradi-
tion and morality can still be seen in modern gaming law.  The
weight allocated to these factors varies, usually depending on the
degree of legalization of gambling in the jurisdiction.  This article
discusses the way in which different states have decided to bal-
ance these often-competing interests.
United States law concerning the enforcement of gambling
debts arises under three different factual scenarios, each with dif-
ferent legal ramifications.  The first situation arises when the ca-
sino is located and the gambler is domiciled in the same state—
“In-State Enforcement.”  The second and third situations arise
when the gambler is not domiciled in the state where the debt was
incurred.  In this situation, the winning party, such as a casino,
can choose to pursue one of two courses:  either 1) sue the gambler
in the state where the debt was made, and then seek to enforce the
judgment where the gambler is domiciled—“Registration of a Sis-
ter–State Judgment”; or 2) sue the gambler directly in the gam-
bler’s home state—“Direct Litigation.”  The following is a
discussion of the laws that are applicable to each of these
situations.
10 Anthony N. Cabot & William Thompson, Gambling and Public Policy, in CASINO
GAMING: POLICY, ECONOMICS AND REGULATION 17, 18 (Anthony N. Cabot ed., 1996).
11 See Mark G. Tratos, Gaming on the Internet III: The Politics of Internet Gaming
and the Genesis of Legal Bans or Licensing, 610 PLI/Pat 711, 752 (2000) (“[M]uch of the
revulsion about gambling from the Christian community relates back to the casting of lots
which the Bible recorded that the Roman soldiers did in an attempt to win the robe of
Christ.”); Ronald J. Rychlak, Lotteries, Revenues and Social Costs: A Historical Examina-
tion of State-Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 13 (1992) (“[T]he cost [of lotteries]
has been shouldered by the impoverished, people prone to compulsive behavior, children
and victims of gambling-related crimes.”); Erika Gosker, Note, The Marketing of Gambling
to the Elderly, 7 ELDER L.J. 185, 187 (1999) (“[S]ome believe that society has convinced the
public that people can obtain and even deserve money without working to earn it.”).
12 See NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT, at 6-2 (1999) available
at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc.indes.html [hereinafter NGISC FINAL REPORT]
(“[G]ambling revenues have proven to be a very important source of funding for many tribal
governments, providing much-needed improvements in the health, education, and welfare
of Native Americans on reservations across the United States.”); Tratos, supra note 11, at
752 (“[G]ambling proponents . . . identify its direct significant socioeconomic benefits.”);
Gosker, supra note 11, at 187 (“[S]tate and local governments view casino gambling as a
source of revenue because it attracts tourists, creates jobs, and generates taxes.”).
13 Cabot & Thompson, supra note 10, at 18 (“Societies that emphasize personal free-
doms and individual choices are more likely to adopt permissive policies on gambling.”).
90 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 5:87
II. IN-STATE ENFORCEMENT
Gambling can take a nearly infinite number of forms, and
each State generally has the freedom to decide whether to legalize
any form of gambling.  The type of gambling that a state has cho-
sen to legalize impacts its gambling debt enforcement or recovery
body of law.  Although there is no perfect way to group the en-
forcement strategies that have developed among the states, some
categorization is helpful to the discussion.  This section splits up
the United States into three broad categories according to the type
of gambling that each state has legalized:  states with only limited
legal gambling and no casinos, states with state-licensed casinos,
and states with Native American Casinos.  In general, states that
have not legalized casinos retain strict laws forbidding the en-
forcement of gambling debts, while those that have legalized casi-
nos have slowly relaxed such prohibitions.  It took Nevada over
fifty years after the legalization of casinos to finally legalize the
collection of gambling debts.  For states that have only recently
legalized casinos, most during the 1990s, this process has just
begun.
A. States with Limited Legal Gambling (No Casinos)
Forty-eight states in the United States have some form of le-
gal gambling; however, only twenty-eight allow casinos.14  Thus,
twenty states legalize limited forms of gambling.  For example,
thirty-eight states and the District of Columbia have a state-sanc-
tioned lottery.15  Many states also allow other types of limited
gambling, such as:  bingo, video poker, and horse or dog track bet-
ting.16  This section focuses on those states that historically have
had a strong public policy against gambling, yet have legalized
some limited forms.  In these states, the obvious starting point is
an examination of which parts of the Statute of Anne have been
retained as law.  Modernly, three parts of the Statute of Anne re-
main relevant:  1) the rule that gambling debts are void; 2) the
provision that allows a loser to recover losses; and 3) the provision
that allows a third party to recover the losses of gamblers.17
Most of these states have retained the first section of the Stat-
ute of Anne, declaring all gambling debts void through specific
14 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 1-1, 2-6.
15 Lottery Industry Leaders Name Michigan Lottery As One of the 10 Most Efficient in
the United States, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 18, 2002.
16 At the time of the NGISC report, stand-alone electronic gambling devices, such as
video poker, were legal in seven states, betting on horse races was legal in forty-three
states, and betting on greyhound dog races was legal in fifteen states. Id. at 2-4, 2-11.
17 See supra notes 1, 3-5.
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statutory provisions.18  Some of these states have even retained
the prohibition, notwithstanding the legality of gambling in that
state.  In Kentucky Off-Track Betting, Inc. v. McBurney,19 the de-
fendant was indebted to an off-track operator for almost $390,000
in checks exchanged for a promissory note.20  After paying eighty-
four thousand dollars, the defendant stopped making payments on
the debt and the off-track operator sued.21  The defendant claimed
that Kentucky law rendered gambling debts unenforceable.22  The
court agreed and refused to recognize the balance of the debt.23
The court rejected the contention that Kentucky had impliedly re-
pealed the prohibition by encouraging betting on horse races via
simulcast and by legalizing a lottery and charitable gambling.24
In Virginia, all gambling debts are void pursuant to “[t]he
public policy of the Commonwealth expressed through statutory
provisions . . . since 1740 . . . .”25  In Hughes v. Cole,26 the Virginia
Supreme Court refused to enforce an alleged oral agreement
among North Carolina residents, which resulted in the purchase
of a nine million dollar Virginia lottery ticket.27  Subsequently,
North Carolina decisions suggested that the agreement was unen-
forceable because it violated North Carolina public policy;28 how-
ever, North Carolina left the issue of enforcement to the Virginia
courts.29  The Virginia Supreme Court then concluded that under
18 E.g., ALA. CODE § 88-1-150 (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-553 (1991); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-1701 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 849.26 (West 2001); GA CODE ANN. § 13-8-3(a)
(2001); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-7 (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.010 (Banks-Baldwin
2001); MINN. STAT. § 541.21 (2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 87-1-1 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:40-1 (West 2000); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 16-1 (2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3763.01
(West 2001); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2031 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-19-17 (2001); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 53-9-2 (Michie 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-19-101 (2001); VA. CODE
ANN. § 11-14 (Michie 2001); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.090 (West 1988); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 55-9-1 (Michie 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.055 (West 2001); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-
23-106 (Michie 2001).
19 993 S.W.2d 946 (Ky. 1999).
20 Id. at 947.
21 Id.
22 Id.  The Kentucky statute states:
Every contract, conveyance, transfer or assurance for the consideration, in whole
or in part, of money, property or other thing won, lost or bet in any game, sport,
pastime or wager, or for the consideration of money, property or other thing lent or
advanced for the purpose of gaming, or lent or advanced at the time of any betting,
gaming, or wagering to a person then actually engaged in betting, gaming, or wa-
gering, is void.
KY. REV. STAT. § 372.010 (Banks-Baldwin 2001).
23 Kentucky Off-Track Betting, 993 S.W.2d at 947.
24 Id. at 948-49.  Two dissenting judges, however, accepted this argument. Id. at 949-
50.
25 Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc. v. Agresta, 569 F. Supp. 24, 25 (E.D. Va. 1983).
26 465 S.E.2d 820, 835 (Va. 1996).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 826 (quoting Cole v. Hughes, 442 S.E.2d 86, 90 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994)).
29 Hughes, 465 S.E.2d at 826.
92 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 5:87
Virginia law, any such agreement would be unenforceable, though
not illegal.30
The validity of the first part of the Statute of Anne, voiding all
gambling contracts, clearly continues in Virginia.  One court has
suggested that the debtor recovery provision may also be opera-
tive.31 Rahmani v. Resorts International Hotel, Inc.,32 involved a
Virginia citizen’s attempt to recover nearly four million dollars in
gambling losses at two New Jersey casinos over the course of thir-
teen years.33  The court, sitting in diversity, dismissed her action
holding that New Jersey law applied and did not provide for such
recovery.34  In dicta, the court noted the result would have been
the same under Virginia law,35 concluding that the Virginia law
permitting the recovery of gambling losses applies only to intra-
state losses.36  The court further opined that if a Virginia gambler
could recover for out-of-state losses pursuant to the Virginia stat-
ute, “it would have the perverse effect of encouraging Virginians
to gamble, albeit out-of-state.”37
Perhaps the most unusual gambling debt case occurred in
Wisconsin, where gambling contracts were void.38  In 1990, Robert
Gonnelly cashed three checks totaling nearly twenty-four thou-
sand dollars at a Kennel Club in order to place bets at the Kennel
Club’s dog races.39  When the State attempted to prosecute Gon-
nelly for issuing worthless checks, his only defense was that the
checks were gaming contracts, and therefore, void.40  The Wiscon-
sin Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s order dismissing the
criminal complaint because checks issued for gaming purposes are
unenforceable.41  Although the gambler was twenty thousand dol-
lars richer, the court did not comment as to whether this was a
desirable outcome, and noted that its “task is simply to ascertain
the legislative intent of the statutes.  If another result is deemed
wiser, it is for the people—through the legislature—and not for
this court to fashion one.”42
30 Id. at 827 (“At the heart of the problem is Code § 11-14, which provides in pertinent
part that ‘[a]ll . . . contracts whereof the whole or any part of the consideration be money or
other valuable thing won . . . at any game . . . shall be utterly void.’”).
31 Rahmani v. Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 2d 932 (E.D. Va. 1998).
32 Id. at 934.
33 Id. at 933-34.
34 Id. at 935.
35 Id. at 935-36.
36 Id. at 936-37.
37 Id.
38 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.055 (West 2001).
39 State v. Gonnelly, 496 N.W.2d 671, 672 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 675.  In 1997, the Wisconsin legislature amended its Statute of Anne provi-
sion, effectively taking specified forms of legal gambling out of the void debt classification.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.055(3).  Minnesota has achieved a similar result through case law.
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Many states have adopted the recovery provisions of the Stat-
ute of Anne.43  These states allow a gambler to recover losses typi-
cally within three to six months of the date of the wager.44  Some
states have also adopted the third party recovery provisions of the
Statute of Anne, allowing any person to sue in place of the loser if
the loser does not sue within the permitted period.45  Often, the
third party is allowed to recover treble damages; however, the
state may require one-half of the recovery be given to the govern-
ment or to a specific fund, such as the county educational fund, as
was required by the Statute of Anne.46
In only a few recent cases has a plaintiff, either the debtor or
a third party, sued to recover gambling losses pursuant to the
Statute of Anne; most of these cases have been in South Carolina.
Between 1991 and 2000, video poker machines were legal in South
Carolina.47  These machines were the basis for several successful
suits for recovery under the South Carolina recovery provision,
which “varies very little in substance” from the original Statute of
Anne.48  These lawsuits addressed four main issues:  1) the correct
In State v. Stevens, 495 N.W.2d 513 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999), the appellate court dismissed
the prosecution of theft by check, based on checks written to purchase pool tabs.  The court
stated, “Because Stevens’ checks were void as to the saloon and the youth hockey associa-
tion, a designated recipient of pull tab proceeds, it was legally impossible for Stevens to
defraud them.  Legal impossibility is a defense to the substantive crime with which Stevens
was charged.” Id. at 515.
43 E.g., ALA. CODE § 8-1-150 (2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-103 (Michie 2001);
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-553 (1991); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1702 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-
3(b) (2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.020 (Banks-Baldwin 2001); MD. ANN. CODE  art. 27,
§ 243 (2001); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 137, § 1 (West 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.315
(2001); MISS. CODE ANN. § 87-1-5 (1991); MO. ANN. STAT. § 434.030 (West 1992); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 23-4-131 (2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:40-5 (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 44-
5-1 (Michie 2001); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3763.02 (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.740
(1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1-10 (Law. Co-op. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-6-1 (Michie
2001) (In 1990, South Dakota modified its law so that § 21-6-1 did “not apply to authorized
gaming and lotteries.” S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 42-7B-55 (Michie 2001)); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 28-3-106 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 11-15 (Michie 2001) (a Virginia court has stated this
section is to be liberally interpreted concerning gambling.  McIntyre v. Smyth, 62 S.E. 930
(Va. 1908)); W. VA. CODE § 55-9-2 (2001).
44 E.g., ALA. CODE § 8-1-150 (six months); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-118-103 (ninety days
or three months); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-554 (West 1991) (three months); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-1702 (three months); GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-3(b) (six months); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 372.020 (five years); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 137, § 1 (three months); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 750.315 (three months); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:40-5 (six months); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3763.02 (six months); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1-10 (three months); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 21-6-1 (six months); TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-106 (ninety days or three months); VA.
CODE ANN. § 11-15 (three months); W. VA. CODE § 55-9-2 (three months).
45 E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1702; GA. CODE ANN. § 13-8-3; KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 372.040; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:40-6; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3763.04.
46 E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1702; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 372.040.
47 The state referendum banning video poker machines as of July 1, 2000, was upheld
by the South Carolina Supreme Court in Joytime Distributors and Amusement Co. v. State,
528 S.E.2d 647 (S.C. 1999).  For a discussion of the legal debate surrounding video poker
machines in South Carolina, see Harriet P. Luttrell, Video Poker: A Survey of Recent Devel-
opments Surrounding the Legal and Moral Debate, 51 S.C. L. REV. 1065 (2000).
48 Berkebile v. Outen, 426 S.E.2d 760, 763 (S.C. 1993).
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burden of proof;49 2) how to apply the statute of limitations;50 3)
whether a party suing in place of a losing gambler was acting in a
collusive fashion;51 and 4) whether the Video Games Machines Act
impliedly repealed the Statute of Anne remedies.52
In Rorrer v. P.J. Club, Inc.,53 the South Carolina Court of Ap-
peals upheld a jury verdict awarding over twenty thousand dollars
to the husband of a compulsive gambler.54  The trial judge had also
awarded treble damages pursuant to a South Carolina statute.55
The basic issue on appeal was whether the trial court correctly
applied the preponderance of the evidence standard in awarding
treble damages, instead of the more difficult clear and convincing
evidence standard.56  The appellate court affirmed, concluding
that the higher standard was unnecessary because the purpose of
the statute was to protect the family of the compulsive gambler.57
The issue regarding application of the statute of limitations
was addressed in Ardis v. Ward.58  In that case, the plaintiff, Bill
Ardis, sued for actual damages plus treble damages on behalf of
Delores Ardis, who lost a total of nearly thirty thousand dollars
over ninety-three different occasions on the defendant’s video
poker machines.59  Each individual loss exceeded the statutory
loss-limit of fifty dollars.60  Mr. Ardis sued because the statute of
limitations on Delores’s action had run after three months.61  The
supreme court remanded the case and allowed Mr. Ardis to pursue
49 Rorrer v. P.J. Club, Inc., 556 S.E.2d 726 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001).
50 Ardis v. Ward, 467 S.E.2d 742 (S.C. 1996).
51 Mullinax v. J.M. Brown Amusement Co., 485 S.E.2d 103 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997), aff’d,
508 S.E.2d 848 (S.C. 1998).
52 Justice v. The Pantry, 496 S.E.2d 871 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998), aff’d, 518 S.E.2d 40 (S.C.
1999).  The South Carolina Statute of Anne-type remedies provide:
In case any person who shall lose such money or other thing as aforesaid shall not,
within the time aforesaid, really and bona fide and without covin or collusion sue
and with effect prosecute for the money or other things so by him or them lost and
paid and delivered as aforesaid, it shall be lawful for any other person, by any such
action or suit as aforesaid, to sue for and recover the same and treble the value
thereof . . . .
S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1-20 (Law. Co-op. 2001).
53 556 S.E.2d 726.
54 Id. at 730.
55 Id. at 728 n.2.
56 Id. at 730.
57 Id. at 731.
58 467 S.E.2d 742 (S.C. 1996); accord Montjoy v. One Stop of Abbeville, Inc., 478
S.E.2d 683 (S.C. 1996).
59 Ardis, 467 S.E.2d at 743.
60 Id.
61 Id. The South Carolina recovery provision provides:
Any person who shall . . . lose to any person or persons so playing or betting, in the
whole, the sum or value of fifty dollars[, can sue] within three months . . . [to]
recover the money or goods so lost and paid or delivered or any part thereof from
the respective winner or winners thereof, with costs of suit . . . .
S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1-10 (Law. Co-op. 1991).
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the claim because a third party suit is not limited by the three
month period.62
In Mullinax v. J.M. Brown Amusement Co.,63 the South Caro-
lina appellate court reversed a trial court’s dismissal of a wife’s
attempt to recover for her husband’s gambling debts.64  The trial
court dismissed the action because it found the suit was “brought
in a collusive fashion,” in violation of the South Carolina third
party recovery statute.65  The appellate court explained that the
statute’s intent was to prevent the gambler from receiving some
benefit from the suit.66  However, Mrs. Mullinax’s situation was
exactly what the statute intended to address:  the financial ruin of
a family due to the compulsive gambling of one spouse.67  The fact
that Mr. Mullinax helped his wife prepare for the suit by provid-
ing information and documentation did not overcome this policy
and make the suit collusive.68
In Justice v. The Pantry,69 the plaintiff filed lawsuits for the
recovery of gambling debts incurred by his mother and sister at
video poker machines.70  The appellate court reversed the trial
court’s decision that the Video Games Machines Act impliedly re-
pealed the recovery statutes.71  Similarly, in McCurry v. Keith,72
the appellate court concluded that recovery of losses was allowed,
irrespective of the legality of the gambling.73  Interestingly, a sub-
sequent appellate decision in the case reduced the plaintiff’s re-
covery, using her winnings as a set off.74
Not all states have legislation mirroring the Statute of Anne.
For instance, North Carolina has no statute that allows losers to
sue to recover gambling losses.75  In State v. Hair,76 the North Car-
62 Ardis, 467 S.E.2d at 744.
63 485 S.E.2d 103 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997), aff’d, 508 S.E.2d 848 (S.C. 1998).
64 Mullinax, 485 S.E.2d at 104.
65 Id. at 105.
66 Id. at 106.
67 Id. at 107.
68 Id.  On remand, the jury took less than two hours to reach a verdict in favor of the
defense.  It seems that the jury refused to believe that the gambler had the seventy thou-
sand dollars he claimed to have lost. See Video Gambling Company Wins Losses Lawsuit,
POST & COURIER (Charlston, S.C.), Jan. 31, 1999, at B3.
69 496 S.E.2d 871 (S.C. Ct. App. 1998), aff’d, 518 S.E.2d 40 (S.C. 1999).
70 Justice, 496 S.E.2d at 872.
71 The South Carolina Supreme Court declined to review the appellate court’s decision
that the Video Games Machines Act did not impliedly repeal S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-1-20—
South Carolina’s State of Anne provisions.  Justice v. The Pantry, 518 S.E.2d 40, 41 n.1
(S.C. 1999).
72 439 S.E.2d 861 (S.C. Ct. App. 1994).
73 Id. at 862.
74 McCurry v. Keith, 481 S.E.2d 166 (S.C. Ct. App. 1997) (setting off the plaintiff’s
recovery by $5,000, from $8,560 to $3,560).
75 State v. Hair, 442 S.E.2d 163, 166 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (“Furthermore, one who
pays a gambling debt owed to another, may not subsequently attempt to recover that which
he has paid.”).
76 Id. at 163.
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olina Court of Appeals overturned a portion of a criminal judg-
ment requiring a defendant convicted of bribery to make
restitution in the amount of a gambling debt.77  The court noted
that because North Carolina had no provision for civil recovery, a
restitution order was inappropriate.78
B. States with State-Licensed Casinos
Nevada, New Jersey, Michigan, and Puerto Rico have large,
land-based casinos,79 while Colorado and South Dakota have
small-scale, land-based casino operations.80  Iowa, Indiana, Illi-
nois, Mississippi, and Missouri have legalized riverboat gam-
bling.81  Louisiana has both land-based and riverboat casinos.82
Every state has developed its own body of law to balance the his-
torical public policy against gambling with the practical need for
legal businesses to be able to recover on credit instruments.  This
section discusses the bodies of law that have developed in several
of the states that have legalized casino gambling.
1. States With Large Land-Based Casinos
a. Nevada
Nevada legalized gambling in 1931,83 but it did not legalize
the enforcement of gambling debts until 1983.84  During the inter-
vening fifty-two years, its courts wrestled with issues related to
the Statute of Anne.  For instance, in 1950, a casino sued a
debtor’s estate to collect eighty-six thousand dollars in unpaid
checks relating to gambling debts.85  The court considered whether
the affirmative defense of unenforceability of gambling debts was
still valid in light of the case law since 1872.86  The court recog-
nized that gambling conditions in Nevada had changed,87 and ana-
lyzed the relevance of the Statute of Anne to Nevada law.88  It
noted that while portions of the Statute of Anne were clearly inap-
77 Id. at 164.
78 Id. at 165-66.
79 AM. GAMING ASS’N, STATE OF THE STATES: THE AGA SURVEY OF CASINO ENTERTAIN-
MENT, Economic Impact, available at http://www.americangaming.org/survey2001/eco-
nomic_impact/TMP971869896.htm [hereinafter AGA SURVEY]; Welcome to Puerto Rico,
Tourist Information, at http://welcome.topuertorico.org/tinfo.shtml (last visited Mar. 22,
2002).
80 AGA SURVEY, supra note 79.
81 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 2-7.  Although Michigan, Indiana, and Illi-
nois have casinos, the author could not find any reported litigation concerning the enforce-
ment of gambling debts in these states.
82 AGA SURVEY, supra note 79.
83 Id.
84 1983 NEV. STAT. § 335, now codified as NEV. REV. STAT. § 463.368 (2001).
85 West Indies, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Nev., 214 P.2d 144, 145 (Nev. 1950).
86 Id. at 146 (citing Scott v. Courtney, 7 Nev. 419 (Nev. 1872)).
87 West Indies, 214 P.2d at 149.
88 Id. at 151-54.
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plicable to contemporary Nevada law, this did not necessitate in-
validating the entire statute unless the provisions were non-
severable.89  Prior case law had deemed section 1 of the Statute of
Anne the law of Nevada,90 and the court concluded that this sec-
tion could be severed from the other outdated portions of the Stat-
ute of Anne.91  Furthermore, the legalization of gaming in 1931,
and subsequent legislation, did not repeal by implication the first
section of the Statute of Anne.92
Today, Nevada enforces gambling debts when credit instru-
ments, such as markers or checks, are cashed at a casino.93  The
Nevada legislature made this change for two reasons.  First, the
gaming collection rate, generally about ninety-five percent, had
“dipped below 90% for the first time in history.”94  Second, Nevada
lost a major case regarding taxation of gaming debts “removing
[the] benefit of having gaming debts remain unenforceable.”95  The
Ninth Circuit ruled that unpaid casino receivables should be
treated and taxed as income, even though the debts were legally
unenforceable.96
Under recent laws, a casino may enforce gambling debts by
immediately filing suit on any enforceable credit instrument and
the underlying debt.97  While regulations for the issuing of credit
to a patron are stringent, failure to follow the regulations does not
invalidate the credit instrument.98  Rather, such violations result
in disciplinary action by the Gaming Control Board.99  An example
of a credit instrument is a marker signed by the patron, which
may be undated and issued to a nonaffiliated company “so that the
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 LIONEL SAWYER & COLLINS, NEVADA GAMING LAW 245 (Anthony N. Cabot ed., 2d ed.
1995) [hereinafter NEVADA GAMING LAW].
94 Id. at 246.
95 Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 664 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (9th Cir. 1982).
96 Id.
97 NEVADA GAMING LAW, supra note 93, at 248.
98 Anthony N. Cabot, Casino Collection Lawsuits: The Basics, GAMING LAW REVIEW
vol. 4 No. 4, at 325 (2000).
99 Id.  Violation of the laws or regulations concerning debt collection practices are
taken very seriously by the Nevada Gaming Control Board.  In August 1998, the Board
fined the Mirage Hotel and Casino, alleging that it violated South Korean law.  The Mirage
collected over five hundred thousand dollars from Korean gamblers in violation of a Korean
law which required government permission to take over ten thousand dollars from South
Korea. Mirage, Tropicana Pay Off Fines, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 21, 1998, at 2D.  The
Mirage paid a $350,000 fine and agreed to “develop written policies on the collection of
Korean debts, in consultation with lawyers in that country.” Id.  Litigation by the woman
who collected the money, and who claims she was wrongfully terminated by the Mirage,
was not settled until August 2001.  Dave Berns, Fired Marketing Executive Settles with
MGM Mirage, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Aug. 8, 2001, at 1D.
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patron does not have to expose his gaming to his banker or
spouse.”100
The casinos have an additional weapon to use against patrons
who refuse to pay their debts:  the unpaid markers may be handed
over to the district attorney for possible criminal prosecution.101
One Illinois debtor, who owed fifty thousand dollars in markers,
pled guilty after being extradited to Nevada and “agreed to make
restitution.”102  Another gambler from Texas escaped prosecution
only by filing bankruptcy.103
In Nguyen v. State,104 the Nevada Supreme Court denied re-
lief to a gambling debtor accused of criminal conduct for violating
Nevada’s bad check law.105  Nguyen signed markers at three casi-
nos, then left Nevada without paying the debts incurred.106  Even-
tually, he entered a plea agreement whereby he pled guilty to
passing a bad check, but reserved the right to appeal the issue of
whether Nevada’s bad check law applied to casino markers.107
The appellate court had little difficulty concluding that the
marker was the equivalent of a check.108  It rejected Nguyen’s con-
tention that a marker was not a check, but instead, a written re-
flection of a loan agreement.109  The court also found that “intent
to defraud was circumstantially demonstrated by his failure to
pay the full amount due within the statutory period, and by the
return of the instruments from his bank with the notation ‘Ac-
count Closed.’”110
Eight months prior to Nguyen, a federal district court reached
the same result.  In Fleeger v. Bell,111 a gambler accumulated a
Nevada debt of over $180,000 in unpaid markers, and was eventu-
100 See NEVADA GAMING LAW, supra note 93, at 252.
101 In Clark County, Nevada, a casino can refer “dishonored Markers” to the “Bad
Check Collections Unit (‘BCU’) of the District Attorney’s Office in Clark County, Nevada.
The BCU is a diversionary program, designed to encourage individuals who wrote bad
checks to pay them because of the threat of prosecution without actually incarcerating
them.”  Desert Palace, Inc. v. Baumblit, Nos. 00-5058, 00-5064, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
17683, at *6 (2d Cir. Aug. 6, 2001).  In Desert Palace, the casino referred the unpaid mark-
ers to the BCU after the debtor filed for bankruptcy.  The United States Court of Appeals
affirmed a district court order that Caesars had acted improperly and its “actions consti-
tuted a deliberate violation of the automatic stay, entitling Baumblit to actual damages.”
Id. at *14.
102 John G. Edwards, Prosecutors Pursue Bad Casino Markers, Unpaid Gambling
Debts Are the Same As Worthless Checks in the Eyes of the District Attorney’s Office, LAS
VEGAS REV.-J., July 28, 1997, at 2D.
103 Id.
104 14 P.3d 515, 520 (Nev. 2000).
105 Id. at 516.
106 Id. at 517.
107 Id.
108 Id. at 518.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 519.
111 95 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1128 (D. Nev. 2000).
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ally arrested in Texas.112  He later filed a class action complaint
alleging that the markers were “IOUs,” rather than negotiable
checks.113  The judge disagreed and granted the defendant’s mo-
tion to dismiss.114  On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit gave significant weight to the intervening Nevada Su-
preme Court conclusion in Nguyen that a marker is a check, and
affirmed the district court decision.115
There is a major distinction between a casino suing on a
credit instrument and a patron’s contractual claim against a ca-
sino.  Patrons who wish to file suit against a casino must first pro-
ceed via an administrative hearing.116  This distinction is based on
both practical and historical concerns.  Should a patron claim that
a casino owes him money, the Gaming Control Board “with its spe-
cialized knowledge of the gaming industry, can better judge the
evidence.”117
b. New Jersey
Prior to New Jersey’s legalization of casinos in 1976,118 its
courts had to determine whether gambling debts legally incurred
in another jurisdiction were enforceable.  The New Jersey Su-
preme Court faced this question in Caribe Hilton Hotel v. To-
land,119 and held that gambling debts incurred at a licensed and
regulated Puerto Rican casino could be enforced against a New
Jersey resident.120 The court recognized a long-standing hostility
by New Jersey courts toward the enforcement of gambling
debts.121  However, it noted that the subsequent legalization of
112 Id.
113 Id. at 1129.
114 Id. at 1133.  Fleeger’s complaint alleged violations of the Fair Debt Collection Prac-
tices Act, common law false arrest, and various civil rights violations, as well as violation of
Nevada gaming regulations. Id. at 1129.
115 Fleeger v. Bell, No. 00-15942, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 25491, at *7 (9th Cir. Nov. 26,
2001).
116 See NEVADA GAMING LAW, supra note 93, at 245.
117 Id.
118 AGA SURVEY, supra note 79.
119 307 A.2d 85 (N.J. 1973).
120 Id. at 89.
121 Id. at 86.  During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, New Jersey public policy
“condemned gambling.” The court stated:
By a comprehensive statute enacted February 8, 1797, gaming in all forms was
declared to be an indictable offense; contracts and security arrangements having
their origin in any form of gambling were declared void; money paid by a loser to a
winner might be recovered in an action in debt and if the loser failed to sue, a third
person might do so and if successful retain one-half the recovery, the balance to
pass to the State. The plaintiff in such an action might have the aid of a court of
equity to compel discovery under oath.
Id. (citations omitted). New Jersey law has retained both the provision voiding gambling
debts and the debt recovery provision of the Statute of Anne.  The code provides that, “[a]ll
wagers, bets or stakes made to depend upon any race or game, or upon any gaming by lot or
chance, or upon any lot, chance, casualty or unknown or contingent event” are unlawful in
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bingo and lotteries, and sister-state judicial decisions, which rec-
ognize such debts, evidenced a change in New Jersey public policy
that no longer allowed the state to bar recovery of a legal gam-
bling debt incurred in another jurisdiction.122  The court reasoned
that differences in states’ policies “should not be considered suffi-
cient to lead a forum court to deny relief where a claim is based
upon the divergent law of . . . [an]other jurisdiction.”123
After the legalization of casinos, the New Jersey courts con-
fronted questions related to the liability of casinos to patrons
when a casino had breached a statutory duty.  In GNOC Corp. v.
Aboud,124 the plaintiff casino sued a gambler for twenty-eight
thousand dollars in unpaid gambling debts.125  The gambler coun-
terclaimed for losses of $250,000 plus punitive damages, alleging
that the casino encouraged him to lose money by serving him alco-
hol.126  New Jersey has a dram-shop statute, which imposes liabil-
ity on certain entities that serve alcohol to intoxicated
individuals.127  The casino filed two summary judgment motions
arguing that, as a matter of law, the casino is not responsible for
the employees who served Aboud while he was intoxicated.128  In
denying summary judgment, the court stated:
In sum, a casino has a duty to refrain from knowingly permit-
ting an invitee to gamble where that patron is obviously and
visibly intoxicated and/or under the influence of a narcotic sub-
stance.  Here there are allegations of patent and overt inebriety
coupled with the consumption of a powerful narcotic medication
prescribed by physicians summoned by and paid for by the ca-
sino itself.  While under the influence of drugs or alcohol, one
suffers a deficit, to varying degrees, of cognitive faculties such
as the power to reason sensibly, to appreciate the danger of ac-
tivities engaged in, and/or to exercise sound judgment.129
One issue mentioned in a footnote in Aboud, but not fully dis-
cussed,130 was whether a violation of the New Jersey Casino Con-
trol Act131 by a casino should permit a private cause of action by a
gambler.  In Miller v. Zoby,132 a debtor’s estate sued a casino jun-
New Jersey. N.J. STAT. § 2A:40-1 (2001).  Furthermore, any person who loses any money or
goods resulting from a violation of § 2A:40-1, may file a civil action and sue to recover the
money or goods paid out to the winner within six months after payment. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:40-5.
122 Toland, 307 A.2d at 89.
123 Id.
124 715 F. Supp. 644 (D.N.J. 1989).
125 Id. at 648.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 653-54 (citing N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 19, § 50-1 (1988)).
128 Aboud, 715 F. Supp. at 646.
129 Id. at 655.
130 Id. at 653 n.130.
131 N.J. STAT. §§ 5:12-1 to -190 (2001).
132 595 A.2d 1104 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991).
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ket operator for having improperly extended credit, resulting in
gambling losses totaling $267,000.133  The court dismissed for fail-
ure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.134  Upon
appellate review of the dismissal, the court concluded that “the
Legislature was satisfied to rely on the elaborate regulatory sanc-
tions provided in the Act and not on private enforcement to police
the general credit practices of the casinos.  ‘The key to the inquiry
is the intent of the Legislature.’”135
The decision in Aboud, which allowed a private right of action
against a casino for the breach of a statute, and the decision in
Miller, which did not allow a private right of action for the breach
of a different statute, both required clarification regarding which
statutes could give rise to a private right of action. Greate Bay
Hotel & Casino v. Tose136 explained and attempted to reconcile
these two cases.
In Tose, the casino sued for unpaid gambling debts totaling
over one million dollars, and Tose counterclaimed to recover over
three million dollars which he claimed to have lost between 1983
and 1987, while gambling in Atlantic City.137  The counterclaim
relied on Aboud, alleging that the casino continued to serve him
alcohol after he was clearly intoxicated.138
The district court granted the casino’s motion for summary
judgment, holding the casino could recover its damages in full.139
On Tose’s counterclaim, the court held that he could recover under
his theory, but that he was limited to those losses that were in-
curred within the six-year statute of limitations.140  In response,
the casino argued that because Tose was an overall winner during
those six years, he should be barred from recovering at all.141  The
court did not agree.142  It concluded that the application of such a
“net winner theory” would produce inequitable results.143  As a re-
sult, only Tose’s counterclaim remained for trial by a jury.144  The
jury was instructed “to make separate findings of liability for each
133 Id.
134 Id. at 1106.
135 Id. at 1108 (quoting Middlesex City Sewerage Auth. v. Sea Clammers, 453 U.S. 1,
13 (1981)).
136 34 F.3d 1228 (3d Cir. 1994).  At a congressional hearing, Tose estimated his gam-
bling losses at between forty to fifty million dollars.  Laurence Arnold, Telling of $50M
Losses, Ex-Eagles Owner Rocks Gambling Panel, RECORD (Northern N.J.), July 1, 1999, at
L7.
137 Tose, 34 F.3d at 1228.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 1229.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.
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of seven dates on which Tose allegedly gambled while visibly in-
toxicated and lost money.”145
At the first trial, the jury found for the casino on four dates,
but it could not reach a unanimous verdict on the other three, and
declared a mistrial regarding those dates.146  At the second trial,
the casino was successful.147  Interestingly, the trial court hinted
that, but for Aboud, it would have granted the casino’s motion for
summary judgment because New Jersey law did not permit a pri-
vate cause of action for a gambler in this area.148  Tose filed an
appeal pro se.149
On appeal, the casino argued that in light of the decision in
Miller, Aboud should be reexamined.150  Nevertheless, the court
determined that Miller and Aboud are not inconsistent; while
Miller established that no private cause of action exists for viola-
tions of the Casino Control Act, Aboud established that a cause of
action is permitted when there is another statute upon which to
rely.151  The intent of the legislature to impose liability in the lat-
ter case was clear because the legislature had addressed the issue
specifically.152
Aboud, Miller, and Tose were also relied upon in a tort case.
In Hakimoglu v. Trump Taj Mahal Associates,153 the debtor sued
in tort to recover over two million dollars in gambling debts, alleg-
ing he was visibly intoxicated at the time he gambled in the defen-
dant’s casino.154  The defendant counterclaimed for seven hundred
thousand dollars in unpaid counterchecks and moved to dismiss
the plaintiff’s claim, alleging that New Jersey law did not permit
145 Id. (quoting Tose v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 819 F. Supp 1312, 1314
(D.N.J. 1993)).
146 Tose, 34 F.3d at 1229.
147 Id.
148 Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1316-1317.  The court held that the case was controlled by
Aboud, stating:
The court acknowledges that Aboud is the law of this case and that pursuant to
the law of the case doctrine the issue will not be relitigated . . . . To the extent that
the Aboud cause of action is viewed as implied by the regulation limiting service of
alcohol to inebriated patrons, or by any other statute or regulation governing ca-
sino operations, it runs afoul of the general notion that private causes of action are
not ordinarily implied from regulatory enactments absent some indication of legis-
lative intent . . . . The New Jersey Appellate Division has already ruled that even a
direct casino violation of the Casino Control Act does not create a private right of
action The case for an implied cause of action is even weaker where, as here, there
is no direct regulation barring the conduct which is alleged to create liability –
permitting an inebriated patron to gamble.
Id. at 1316 n.8 (citations omitted).
149 Tose, 34 F.3d at 1235 n.13.
150 Id. at 1232 n.7.
151 Id.
152 Tose, 819 F. Supp. at 1316 n.8.
153 876 F. Supp. 625, 627 (D.N.J. 1994), aff’d, 70 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1995).  The com-
plaint alleged negligence, intentional or malicious conduct, and unjust enrichment which
the “plaintiff . . . [had] collapsed . . . into a single theory of dram-shop liability.” Id. at 629.
154 Id. at 627.
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such a cause of action.155  The defendant also moved to strike the
plaintiff’s affirmative defense of intoxication.156  After considering
the cases discussed above, the court stated that neither dram-shop
liability, nor the Casino Control Act, supported an implied tort
law cause of action for recovery of gambling losses incurred while
intoxicated.157  The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
the dismissal and stated, “[W]e predict that the New Jersey Su-
preme Court would not permit recovery on claims such as those
asserted by the plaintiff . . . . ”158
c. Puerto Rico
Like Nevada and New Jersey, Puerto Rico has legal, regu-
lated casinos.159  Puerto Rico is also similar to Nevada and New
Jersey in that it allows the enforcement of legally incurred gam-
bling debts through court actions.  In Puerto Rico, a “person who
loses in a game or a bet which is not prohibited is civilly liable.”160
Civil recovery of a gambling debt is limited in Puerto Rico by the
“good father” principle, which was originally found in the Spanish
Code.161  Puerto Rico does not allow any type of action to recover
winnings or debts in games of chance that are not legal within the
territory.162  Nevertheless, a person may recover bets on illegal
games if there is evidence of fraud or the debtor is a minor or
incapacitated.163
In Posadas de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Radin,164 a gambler ap-
pealed from summary judgments entered against him in two le-
gally and factually similar cases.  The gambler received fifteen
thousand dollars in credit from each of two hotel casinos, and the
casinos sued when the gambler refused to pay the debts.165  The
court affirmed the lower court decision, which awarded the two
casinos thirty thousand dollars plus collection expenses.166
155 Id. at 627, 629.
156 Id. at 637.
157 Id. at 631.  Judge Rodriguez issued an order denying motion for reargument on May
11, 1992. Id. at n.4.
158 Hakimoglu, 70 F.3d at 294.  The dissent argued, “From New Jersey’s perspective,
requiring casinos to protect gamblers from losses flowing from their excessive service of
alcohol would probably also be in the public interest.” Id. at 298.  New Jersey would likely
recognize a cause of action against a casino.  Id. at 299.
159 Welcome to Puerto Rico!, Tourist Information, at http://welcome.topuertorico.org/
tinfo.shtml (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
160 31 P.R. LAWS ANN. § 4774 (1991).
161 Id.  The “good father” principle allows a trial court to reduce or eliminate the debt if
it is more than a good father could pay. Id.
162 Id. § 4771.
163 Id.
164 856 F.2d 399, 400 (1st Cir. 1988).
165 Id.
166 Id.
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In his appeal, the gambler advanced two arguments.  First, he
argued the judgments should be overturned because the trial
court judge did not conduct evidentiary hearings to determine
whether the gambler’s debts should be reduced under the good fa-
ther defense.167  The court concluded that the appellant did not
present any issues at the summary judgment hearing that were
not considered by the trial court, and an evidentiary hearing is not
mandated when the only remaining issue is an issue of law for the
court to decide.168  The court also pointed out that the parties
brought the good father defense to the trial judge’s attention on
two different occasions, and the judge had expressly rejected the
defense as meritless.169
The gambler’s second argument was that genuine issues of
material fact existed as to whether the gambler was under duress
when he signed the markers.170  The court rejected this argument
because the only evidence supporting it was an affidavit stating
that the gambler was forced to sign the credit agreements.171  The
court held that the language of the affidavit was too vague and
conclusory to successfully oppose the motions for summary judg-
ment.172  Therefore, it appears that Puerto Rico will enforce legally
incurred gambling debts, and the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit will uphold state or territorial laws that allow for the en-
forcement of gambling debts.
2. States With Small Scale, Land-Based Casinos
a. Colorado
Colorado allows gambling in three historic mining towns.173
The amount of any single wager, however, is limited to five dol-
lars, and it only allows three types of casino games:  poker, black-
jack, and slot machines.174  This limited gambling was authorized
by the voters in a constitutional amendment initiated and passed
by Colorado citizens.175  Other forms of limited gambling are also
permitted, including charitable bingo games or raffles,176 a state
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. at 401.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 The Colorado Division of Gaming, Colorado Department of Revenue, Colorado
Gaming Questions and Answers, at http://www.gaming.state.co.us/dogfaq.htm (last visited
Mar. 22, 2002).
174 Id.
175 INTERNATIONAL CASINO LAW 17 (Anthony N. Cabot et al. eds., 3d ed. 1999) [herein-
after INT’L CASINO LAW].
176 COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-9-105 to -107 (2001); Colorado Department of Revenue,
Other Colorado Wagering Activities, at http://www.gaming.state.co.us/ (last visited Mar.
26, 2002).
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lottery,177 and horse and dog racing.178  Colorado prohibits casinos
from extending credit to players.179
Unlike many states that invalidate gaming debts pursuant to
the Statute of Anne, Colorado depends on nineteenth century case
law that prohibits enforcement actions because they are a waste of
judicial resources.180  Nevertheless, more recent case law indicates
that enforcement may be possible for legally incurred “social”
gaming debts.  In Houston v. Younghans,181 the Colorado Supreme
Court was asked to enforce a debt arising from a poker game be-
tween friends.182  Such social gambling is specifically excluded
from Colorado’s gambling prohibition.183  The court found that, be-
cause the debt was not incurred as part of “professional” gambling
under Colorado law, the debt was enforceable.184
b. South Dakota
South Dakota began allowing limited casino gaming in the
town of Deadwood in November 1989; by 2001, there were forty
operating casinos.185  Blackjack, poker, and slot machines are the
only forms of gaming that are legal,186 and the state limits the
amount of any single bet to one hundred dollars.187  South Dakota
also established strict controls on check cashing at casinos,188 and
does not allow casinos or casino employees to extend credit for
gambling.189
With the exception of debts incurred for authorized gaming
and lotteries, gambling debts remain void.190  In Bayer v. Burke,191
the court interpreted the statute narrowly when it granted sum-
mary judgment on behalf of a bettor who signed promissory notes
177 The Colorado Lottery, at www.coloradolottery.com/home.cfm (last visited Mar. 26,
2002).
178 COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47.1-815 (2002); COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-60-510 (1996); Colo-
rado Division of Racing Events, Colorado Department of Revenue, at http://
www.state.co.us/gov_dir/revenue_dir/racing_dir/coracing.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
179 INT’L CASINO LAW, supra note 175.
180 Eldred v. Malloy, 2 Colo. 320, 321-22 (1874) (“The courts of this territory have
enough to do without devoting their time to the solution of questions arising out of idle bets
made on dog and cock fights, horse races, the speed of ox trains, the construction of rail-
roads, the number on a dice or the character of a card that may be turned up.”).
181 580 P.2d 801 (Colo. 1978).
182 Id.
183 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-10-102(2)(d); Younghans, 580 P.2d at 802-03.
184 Younghans, 580 P.2d at 803.
185 AGA SURVEY, supra note 79.
186 Commission on Gaming, South Dakota Department of Commerce and Regulation,
Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.state.sd.us/dcr/gaming/frequent.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 22, 2002). This restriction also applies to the state’s nine Native American casi-
nos. Id.
187 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 42-7B-14 (Michie 2001).
188 S.D. ADMIN. R. 20:18 app. A § 525 (2002).
189 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 42-7B-45.
190 Id. §§ 42-7B-47, 53-9-2.
191 338 N.W.2d 293, 293-94 (S.D. 1983).
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for over two hundred thousand dollars.192  The creditor argued
that the consideration for the notes was not a wager, but instead
was an agreement not to sue the bettor on outstanding debts for
other losses; the court did not agree.193  The court reasoned that,
while forbearance of suit is adequate consideration, the
threatened suit concerned a contract that was void because the
sole basis of the contract was gambling.194
Along with voiding all gambling debts, South Dakota law also
continues to retain recovery provisions similar to section 2 of the
Statute of Anne.  Gamblers can recover gambling losses from the
person with whom the bet was made, or from the proprietor of the
place where the bet was made, if the gambler pursues a cause of
action within six months.195  If the gambler does not pursue an
action within six months, the state’s attorney will pursue an ac-
tion for the benefit of the gambler’s spouse and children, or if the
gambler is not married, for the benefit of the public schools.196
These recovery provisions do not apply to losses incurred in au-
thorized casinos.197
3. States With Casinos Connected to Water
a. Iowa
In 1989, Iowa legalized riverboat casinos on navigable wa-
ters,198 and now has ten riverboat casinos.199  Although personal
checks are lawful for certain forms of gambling, casinos cannot
accept credit cards in exchange for coins, tokens, or any other form
of credit.200  In fact, Iowa law criminalizes the collection of gam-
bling debts.201  Currently, there are no cases in Iowa where at-
tempts have been made to collect gambling debts.  Nevertheless, it
is interesting to examine the treatment of credit cards and cash
machines in or near casinos.
192 Id. at 293.
193 Id. at 294.
194 Id.
195 S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-6-1 (Michie 2001).
196 Id. § 21-6-2.
197 Id. § 42-7B-55.
198 Trudy D. Fountain, Rolling Down the Mississippi From Minnesota to Louisiana and
out the High Seas - Riverboat Gambling and Cruise Ship Gambling, 89 ALI-ABA 79, 82
(2001).
199 Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, State of Iowa Licensed Facilities, at http://
www3.state.ia.us/irgc/licensees_map2.htm (last modified Dec. 31, 2001).  Iowa also has two
greyhound dog racing facilities, one horse racing facility, and three Native American casi-
nos. Id.; Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission, Indian Gaming, at www3.state.ia.us/irgc/
Indian.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2002).
200 IOWA CODE § 99B.17 (2002); Id. § 99F.9(6).
201 IOWA CODE § 725.18.  This section states, “Any person who knowingly offers, gives
or sells the person’s services for use in collecting or enforcing any debt arising from gam-
bling, whether or not lawful gambling, commits an aggravated misdemeanor.” Id.
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In November 1998, the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission
(IRGC) began eliminating cash dispensing credit card machines in
casinos.202  Previously, the legislature had debated a ban on the
machines, but never finalized its decision.203  In order to effectuate
its ruling, the IRGC denied new credit card cash machine con-
tracts and declined to renew existing contracts.204  In January
1999, the IRCG accelerated the process by requiring the removal
of all credit card machines by the end of February 1999.205  In-
cluded in this ban were Com-Check machines.206  At that time, the
regulation did not affect Automated Teller Machines in casinos be-
cause they gave access to only limited amounts of cash.207
The IRGC’s decision was overturned by a trial judge in Janu-
ary 2000, because “ ‘This court remains convinced the IRGC ex-
ceeded its authority by enacting a rule that amended existing
Iowa law . . . .’ The Iowa Legislature had already spoken on the
issue of casino credit and chose to stop short of banning such cash
advances.”208  The judge also noted that the IRGC’s rule would dis-
courage Iowa tourism because gamblers would choose to visit
states with less stringent gambling credit rules.209
b. Mississippi
Mississippi legalized dockside casino gambling in 1990.210  At
common law, all gambling debts were unenforceable.211  However,
Mississippi has passed laws creating two exceptions:  patron
claims against casinos and enforcement of proper credit
instruments.
Mississippi has passed laws allowing patrons of licensed casi-
nos to enforce claims against the casino.212  Like Nevada, Missis-
sippi requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies in
virtually every contractual claim by a patron against a casino.213
202 Robert Dorr, Panel Curtails Cash Advances in Iowa Casinos, OMAHA WORLD-HER-
ALD, Nov. 20, 1998, at 1, available at 1998 WL 5527299.
203 Id.
204 Id.
205 Greg Smith, Regulators Restrict Use of Credit at Casinos, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan.
22, 1999.
206 Id. These machines scan the gambler’s credit card, the gambler inputs how much
money he or she wanted to spend on gambling tokens, the gambler receives a receipt, and
the receipt could be taken to the teller to receive cash. Id.
207 Dorr, supra note 202.
208 Judge Throws Out ATM Ban in Casinos, ASSOCIATED PRESS NEWSWIRES, Jan. 20,
2000 (quoting Polk County District Judge Robert Hutchinson).
209 Id.
210 Mississippi Gaming Commission, About MGC, History, at http://www.mgc.state.
ms.us/main-about.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
211 Grand Casino Tunica v. Shindler, 772 So. 2d 1036, 1038 (Miss. 2000).
212 MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-76-157 to -165 (2002).
213 Thomas v. Isle of Capri Casino, 781 So. 2d. 125, 127 (Miss. 2001) (upholding, albeit
“reluctantly,” a trial court’s denial of relief to a player who claimed a jackpot); NEVADA
GAMING LAW, supra note 93, at 252.
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Patrons must first litigate their claims before the Mississippi
Gaming Commission, whose decisions are appeallable to Missis-
sippi state courts.214  Judicial review of Commission decisions is
highly deferential. Courts will uphold any Mississippi Gaming
Commission decision unless:  it violates a constitutional provision;
it is outside the Commission’s jurisdiction; it was rendered using
unlawful procedures; no evidence supports the decision; or the de-
cision was arbitrary or capricious.215  The Commission’s violation
of one of these factors must also prejudice a petitioner’s substan-
tial rights.216
Gambling debts evidenced by credit instruments are excluded
from the general unenforceability rule.217  These debts may be en-
forced directly through Mississippi’s legal process.218  However,
Mississippi courts will only enforce gaming credit instruments if
the extension of credit was proper under the Mississippi Gaming
Commission rules.219  Another interesting feature of Mississippi
law is the “Exclusion List.”  This exclusion list is not voluntary,
and the regulations put an affirmative duty on a casino to report
and exclude any person on the list.  Thus, a question of casino lia-
bility arises when a casino fails to fulfill its statutory duties.  All
licensed casinos have a duty “to inform the Executive Director in
writing of the names of the persons such licensee reasonably be-
lieves meet the criteria for placement on an Exclusion List.”220
When it is determined that the person is a candidate for exclusion,
a petition is filed.221  Notice must be given to the person to be ex-
cluded, who has the opportunity to refute the allegations at a
hearing conducted by the Commission and reviewable by the
courts.222  This list is distributed to all licensed gambling estab-
214 MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-76-167 to -173.
215 Grand Casino Tunica, 772 So. 2d at 1040.
216 Id.
217 MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-76-157 (“gaming debts not evidenced by a credit instrument
are void and unenforceable . . . .”).
218 Id. § 75-76-175.
219 INT’L CASINO LAW, supra note 175, at 88.
220 MISS. GAMING COMM’N REG. III(V)(1).  The regulation states:
The Executive Director may place a person on the exclusion list pending a hearing
if such person has:
(a) Been convicted of a felony in any jurisdiction, of any crime of moral turpitude
or of a crime involving Gaming;
(b) Violated or conspired to violate the provisions of the Act relating to involve-
ment in gaming without required licenses, or willful evasion of fees or taxes;
(c) A notorious or unsavory reputation which would adversely affect public confi-
dence and trust in gaming; or
(d) His name [is] on any valid and current exclusion list from another jurisdiction
in the United States.
Id.
221 Id. III(V)(4).
222 Id.
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lishments, which then have an affirmative duty to eject or exclude
all persons on the list.223
c. Missouri
Missouri voters approved a referendum to legalize riverboat
gambling by a sixty-three percent majority in 1992.224  However,
implementation of the new law was not a smooth process.  Critics
pointed out that the new law did not exclude convicted felons from
obtaining gaming licenses, and argued that the Tourism Commis-
sion was not the proper agency to promulgate regulations simply
because gambling would presumably be a significant tourist at-
traction.225  The Missouri Gaming Commission was created in
1993 to address these concerns.  After several challenges arising
from the Missouri constitution, Missouri now permits riverboat
gambling, including gambling at casinos built in artificial basins
located within one thousand feet of the Mississippi or Missouri
rivers.226
The original Missouri referendum placed a loss limit of five
hundred dollars per person, per excursion, on wagers placed at
riverboat casinos.227  This provision was codified by the state legis-
lature and became part of the riverboat casino regulations
promulgated by the Missouri Gaming Commission.228  However, a
problem arose with the definition of “excursion,” which was de-
fined as any time “gambling games may be operated on an excur-
sion gambling boat whether docked or during a cruise.”229  Under
this definition, games can be operated continuously on boats that
are permanently docked, circumventing the five hundred dollar
per excursion loss-limit.230  The Commission’s solution was to put
the responsibility back on casinos by requiring licensees to ensure
that gamblers do not lose more than the five hundred dollar
limit.231
Missouri law also allows a person to permanently exclude
oneself from casino gambling.232  If the excluded person enters a
223 Id. III(V)(1).
224 Mo. Gaming Comm’n, The History of Riverboat Gambling, at http://www.mgc.state.
mo.us/history.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
225 Id.
226 Id. (detailing the history of gambling legalization in Missouri, including constitu-
tional challenges, voter referenda, and the development of the “boat in a basin” laws).
227 Id.
228 MO. ANN. STAT. § 313.805 (West 2001); MO. CODE  REGS. ANN. tit. 11, § 45-6.040
(2002).
229 Mo. Gaming Comm’n, supra note 224.
230 Id.
231 MO. CODE  REGS. ANN. tit. 11, § 45-6.040.
232 MO. ANN. STAT. § 313.813; see also Stephanie S. Maniscalco, Gambling Addict Suits
vs. Casinos Are Foreseen: ‘Self-Exclusion’ Program May Create Duty, 15 MO. LAW. WKLY.
1409 (Dec. 17, 2001) (“The List of Disassociated Persons . . .  includes more than 3,500
names.”).
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casino, that person may be subject to criminal trespass charges.233
Plaintiffs’ lawyers have suggested that if a casino does not catch a
self-excluded person, they may be subject to liability, but this con-
cept has not been tested in Missouri courts.234
Missouri has a modern version of the Statute of Anne whereby
gamblers may recover wagering losses.235  However, there have
been no reported cases in which a gambler has attempted to re-
cover wagers since the legalization of riverboat gambling in 1992,
so it is not clear whether a court will continue to apply the statute
to legal gambling within the state.236  It is clear from the riverboat
gaming statutes that casinos cannot extend credit for the purpose
of gambling.  Casinos are not permitted to take anything of value
other than money in exchange for gambling tokens or chips.237  Vi-
olation of this provision subjects the casino to a misdemeanor.238
4. Louisiana:  The State With Both Land-Based and
Water-Related Casinos
Louisiana law retains elements of Roman law.  Specifically,
Louisiana law provides as follows:  “The law grants no action for
the payment of what has been won at gaming or by a bet, except
for games tending to promote skill in the use of arms, such as the
exercise of the gun and foot, horse and chariot racing.”239  The Lou-
isiana statute goes on to say, “In all cases in which the law refuses
an action to the winner, it also refuses to suffer the loser to re-
claim what he has voluntarily paid, unless there has been, on the
part of the winner, fraud, deceit, or swindling.”240
Despite these laws, Louisiana courts allow casinos and their
assigns to recover what other jurisdictions would consider to be
gambling debts.  In TeleRecovery of Louisiana., Inc. v. Major,241 a
Louisiana appeals court held that as assignee for two casinos, a
collection agency could bring an action to recover sixty-five thou-
sand dollars from six checks received in exchange for the
233 MO. ANN. STAT. § 313.813.
234 Maniscalco, supra note 232.  Plaintiffs’ lawyers have raised this question,  “If gam-
bling debts are not enforceable in Missouri and someone is advanced money by an ATM, is
there a challenge to enforceability of these transactions?” Id.
235 MO. ANN. STAT. § 434.030 (West 1992).  This section states, “Any person who shall
lose any money or property at any game, gambling device or by any bet or wager whatever,
may recover the same by a civil action.” Id.
236 In State v. Small, 24 S.W.3d 60, 66-67 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000), the Missouri Appellate
Court denied relief to an attorney who sued casinos under section 434.030. Id.  However,
the court did not address section 434.030 because it was able to dispose of the case on other
grounds. Id.
237 MO. ANN. STAT. § 313.830(6).
238 Id.
239 LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2983 (West 2001).  The amount may be reduced if the trial
judge finds it excessive. Id.
240 Id. art. 2984.
241 734 So. 2d 947 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
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equivalent value of chips because the transaction did not create a
gambling debt.242  The court reasoned that the statutes were irrel-
evant because no debt was incurred.243  The court went so far as to
state that whether the subsequent use of the chips was legal was
irrelevant because, after receiving the chips, the defendant could
have immediately cashed them.244  The purchase of chips was a
separate transaction that was legal and enforceable.245
Like Nevada, in Louisiana the State may prosecute a gambler
for writing a bad check.  In State v. Dean,246 the defendant wrote
twenty-one thousand dollars worth of bad checks, and the State
charged him with writing worthless checks.247  In a motion to
quash, the defendant argued that because public policy prohibited
civil enforcement of gambling debts, it also prohibited criminal
punishment for the same conduct.248  When the trial court denied
his motion, the defendant pled guilty, but reserved the right to
appeal the denial of the motion to quash.249  The appellate court
had little difficulty affirming the conviction, even though it was a
case of first impression.250  The court emphasized that the
riverboat casino was a legitimate business allowed by the legisla-
ture.251  It opined that it would be an absurd result to say that a
patron of a legal business was free to defraud it, and then rely on
the nature of the business to escape punishment.252  The court also
noted that concerns underlying the prohibition of civil enforce-
ment—for example, the protection of habitual gamblers—did not
apply in the criminal context because addicts of all kinds are crim-
inally punished for the illegal acts that they commit.253
A debtor was also unsuccessful in Players Lake Charles, LLC,
v. Tribble,254 where the casino allegedly threatened criminal pros-
ecution unless she signed a promissory note for six payments to-
taling over thirty thousand dollars.255  The court held the markers
242 Id. at 948, 951.
243 Id. at 950-51.
244 Id. at 950.
245 Id.
246 748 So. 2d 57 (La. Ct. App. 1999).
247 Id. at 58.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 Id. at 59.
251 Id. at 60.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 59-60.  The defendant was sentenced to two years of hard labor (suspended),
five years of probation, restitution of nine thousand dollars, and other penalties. Id. at 58-
61.  For a critical analysis of the Louisiana decision, see Tiffany Cashwell, Casenote, A
Continuing Debate: Public Policy and Welfare Versus Economic Interests Regarding En-
forcement of Gambling Debts in State v. Dean, 46 LOY. L. REV. 299 (2000).
254 779 So. 2d 1058, 1059 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
255 Id.
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that the defendant signed were not gambling debts because she
could have used the chips for non-gambling purposes.256
C. States with Native American Casinos
In any debt collection matter involving a Native American ca-
sino it is essential to first examine the terms of the relevant Tri-
bal-State compact; a compact is mandatory for any Class III
gaming.257  In 1995, the Mashantucket Pequots passed the “Debt
Collection Law,” which established procedures for payment of ca-
sino debts.258  Pursuant to the procedures, if the debtor does not
pay the marker, the marker is presented to the bank.259  If the
bank account has insufficient funds, the debtor is contacted.260  If
the debtor refuses to pay, litigation will be initiated in the tribal
court.261  Once a tribal court judgment is entered, often by default,
enforcement is sought by bringing suit in the state where the
debtor resides.262  An emerging issue in tribal gaming is whether
gambling debts incurred at reservations are enforceable in state
courts; such judgments have been enforced in Connecticut and
New York.263
Connecticut has allowed enforcement of tribal gaming debts
in its state courts.  In Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprises v.
Kennedy,264 a Connecticut court concluded that the provisions of
the tribal-state compact took precedence over Connecticut stat-
utes that did not allow the enforcement of gambling debts.265
More specifically, the court focused on the issue of whether federal
law should preempt state law in the context of Indian Gaming.266
The court determined that the issue should be resolved according
to “principles of federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause
of the United States Constitution.”267  In finding that the gaming
debts are enforceable despite state law to the contrary, the court
256 Id. at 1060.
257 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2001).  Class III gaming is defined in the negative as “all
forms of gaming that are not class I gaming or class II gaming.” Id. § 2703(8).  However,
subsection (7)(B) explains that class II gaming does not include “any banking card games”
or slot machines, thus by implication, these types of games would qualify as class III gam-
ing. Id. § 2703(7)(B).
258 Patrice H. Kunesh, Enforcement of Gaming Debts Beyond Tribal Court, LEGAL
NEWS (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation), June 2001, at 1.
259 Id. at 1-2.
260 Id.
261 Id. at 2.
262 Id.
263 The Pequots claim they have also been successful in enforcing gambling debts with
judicial decisions in Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Maine, Florida, Pennsylvania, and New
Jersey.  Kunesh, supra note 258, at 1.
264 No. 116860, 2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 679 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 14, 2000).
265 Id. at *19.
266 Id. at *12.
267 Id.
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favored a liberal reading of Connecticut law so as to enhance tri-
bal sovereignty.268  Accordingly, the court held that a state policy
against gaming cannot preempt an act of Congress.269
In Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise v. DiMasi,270 a
Connecticut court recognized a tribal gaming judgment under the
principle of comity.271  Then, in Mashantucket Pequot Gaming En-
terprise v. Renzulli,272 the defendant was issued two markers to-
taling five thousand dollars.273  When the markers were returned
for insufficient funds, the tribe attempted to contact the defendant
in order to collect upon the debt, however, the defendant refused
to respond to any correspondence.274  Persuaded by the fact that
the Connecticut courts, pursuant to that state’s compact with the
Pequots, enforced tribal court decisions “under the principle of
comity,”275 the New York trial court enforced the tribal court
judgment.276
In CBA Credit Services v. Azar,277 Native American casino em-
ployees encouraged casino patron Azar, who had already lost four-
teen thousand dollars, to accept four thousand dollars in black
jack chips on credit.278  After losing these additional chips, Azar
was asked by the casino to complete a credit document and write a
check to pay for the chips.279  The check was returned due to insuf-
ficient funds and the casino assigned its collection claim to a col-
lection agency.280  Minnesota law, which the parties agreed was
controlling, provides a specific exception from its general prohibi-
tion on the collection of gambling debts pursuant to gaming con-
ducted under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.281  The specific
exception provides that a “holder in due course [with] no notice of
the illegality of the obligation,” is not barred from collecting on the
debt.282  Because the court found that the assignee was aware that
268 Id. at *14-15.
269 Id. at *13, 22-23.  “The legislative history of IGRA reveals that Congress intended
the Tribal-State compact to be the exclusive means for states to exercise regulatory control
and jurisdiction over gaming activities on Indian lands.”  Id. at *19 (emphasis added).
270 CV 990117677S, 1999 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2584, *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 23,
1999).
271 Id. at *2, 14.
272 188 Misc. 2d 710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001).
273 Id. at 711.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 712-13.
276 Id. at 710-11.
277 551 N.W.2d 787 (N.D. 1996).
278 Id. at 788.
279 Id. at 790.
280 Id.
281 Id. at 789; see also Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-21 (2001);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 541.21 (West 2000).
282 551 N.W.2d at 790 (citing State v. Stevens, 459 N.W.2d 513, 514-15 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990)).
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Azar’s checks had been dishonored, it held the debt was
unenforceable.283
III. REGISTRATION OF A SISTER-STATE JUDGMENT
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution re-
quires that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State.”284  In Fauntleroy v. Lum,285 the U.S. Supreme Court inter-
preted the Full Faith and Credit Clause as restricting a state’s
examination of a sister state judgment to whether the sister state
had jurisdiction over either the person or the subject matter at
issue.286  In other words, a court cannot revisit the merits of the
substantive issues of the underlying case.287  Therefore, while pub-
lic policy in many U.S. jurisdictions prohibits the enforcement of
gambling debts, these jurisdictions have uniformly concluded that
once a sister state has rendered judgment on a gambling debt, the
Full Faith and Credit Clause mandates enforcement of that
judgment.288
In a gaming debt collection case much depends, of course, on
which state’s law applies.  In Harrah’s Club v. Van Blitter,289 a
283 Azar, 551 N.W.2d at 790.
284 U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 1.
285 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
286 Id. at 237.
287 Id.
288 See, e.g., Hilton Int’l Co. v. Arace, 394 A.2d 739, 744 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977) (“The
public policy of Connecticut cannot prevail against the command of the federal constitu-
tion.”); Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Hornstein, 695 So. 2d 471 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)
(“Florida courts are obligated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to recognize judgments
which have been validly rendered in the courts of sister states, including those based on
gambling debts.”); Kramer v. Bally’s Park Place, Inc., 535 A.2d 466, 469 (Md. App. 1988)
(“[T]he relevant judicial opinions and statutes do not represent a public policy so strongly
opposed to gambling or gambling debts that it overrides the lex loci contractus principle.”);
Claridge at Park Place, Inc. v. Matellian, No. 95-1748, 1996 Mass. Super. LEXIS 540, at *4
(Mass. Super. Ct. Apr. 22, 1996) (holding that although Massachusetts law did not allow
the enforcement of legal gambling debts, Massachusetts must recognize sister-state judg-
ments concerning gambling debts); Int’l Recovery Sys., Inc. v. Gabler, 527 N.W.2d 20, 22
(Ct. App. Mich. 1995) (holding that state public policy was irrelevant to the registration of
sister-state judgments due to the Full Faith and Credit Clause); San Juan Hotel Corp. v.
Greenberg, 502 F. Supp. 34, 36 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (allowing New York enforcement of a Pu-
erto Rican judgment); MGM Desert Inn, Inc. v. Holz, 411 S.E.2d 399, 402 (N.C. Ct. App.
1991) (concluding that although enforcement of gambling debts is clearly against North
Carolina public policy, U.S. Supreme Court precedent rendered the Full Faith and Credit
Clause virtually free from exceptions); Hotel Ramada of Nev., Inc., v. Thakkar, No.
03A019103CV00113, 1991 WL 135471, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 25, 1991) (stating that
there are only three exceptions to the requirement of registering sister-state judgments:
lack of jurisdiction, fraud upon the foreign court, and violation of state public policy, how-
ever, Tennessee public policy does not preclude the enforcement of gambling debts incurred
in a jurisdiction where gaming is legal); Coghill v. Boardwalk Regency Corp., 396 S.E.2d
838, 839 (Va. 1990) (holding that after the United States Supreme Court decision in Faun-
tleroy v. Lum, Virgina could not reexamine the judgment of a sister state).
289 No. Civil R-86-21 BRT, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18348 (D. Nev. Feb. 16, 1988), aff’d,
902 F.2d 774 (9th Cir. 1990).
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gambler tried to make California the forum state because gam-
bling debts are not enforceable under California law.290  Van Blit-
ter had lost approximately $265,000 on a gambling spree, which
she claimed was the result of her husband’s affairs with geishas.291
First, Van Blitter argued that Harrah’s breached its duty of fair-
ness when it failed to control her gambling, and then exacerbated
this breach by providing her with complimentary accommodations
encouraging her to gamble further, after it became clear that she
was an unsuccessful player.292  Second, Van Blitter argued that
Harrah’s collection attempts were a breach of its contractual obli-
gations because an unidentified Harrah’s employee had orally
agreed that the casino would not collect the debts.293
Van Blitter commenced litigation in federal district court in
California, requesting a declaration that her gambling debts were
unenforceable.294  In response, Harrah’s filed a complaint in fed-
eral court in Nevada to enforce Van Blitter’s debts.295  The Califor-
nia action was subsequently transferred to the Nevada federal
court.296  Although the two actions were consolidated for trial, they
remained separate in identity.297  The Nevada federal District
Court granted both Van Blitter’s and Harrah’s motions for sum-
mary judgment.298  The final order stated:
(1) Toshi Van Blitter is given and granted judgment against
Harrah’s club [in the California action], a corporation, with the
force and effect that the negotiable instruments which are the
subject matter of this action (the twenty instruments drawn
upon Van Blitter’s checking account number . . . are not enforce-
able in the State of California).
(2) Harrah’s Club, a corporation, is given and granted judgment
against Toshi Van Blitter [in the Nevada action] for the sum of
Two Hundred Sixty Five Thousand Dollars ($265,000), together
with interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per an-
num from April 25, 1984. . . .299
The Court of Appeals explained that the summary judgment
in favor of Van Blitter did “not address the enforceability in Cali-
fornia of a Nevada judgment on the instruments or on the obliga-
tion they represent under the principles of full faith and credit.”300
290 Harrah’s Club v. Van Blitter, 902 F.2d 774, 776 (9th Cir. 1990).
291 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *2.
292 Id. at *4.
293 Id. at *4-5.
294 Van Blitter, 902 F.2d at 775.
295 Id.
296 Id.
297 Id.
298 Id. at 775-76.
299 Id. at 776 (quoting the Nevada District Court’s final order of judgment).
300 Van Blitter, 902 F.2d at 776 (emphasis removed).
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Thus, Harrah’s registered the Nevada judgment for enforcement
in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California.301
Van Blitter then filed a motion in that court to bar enforce-
ment of the Nevada judgment, claiming that it contradicted the
previous summary judgment, which held that her gambling debts
were unenforceable in California.302  When the federal court in
California rejected her argument, Van Blitter appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.303  She argued that because
she had obtained a judgment, which held that her debts were un-
enforceable in California, enforcement of a Nevada judgment on
those debts was also barred.304  The court found this argument
“wholly without merit,” and awarded Harrah’s double costs and
attorney fees as a penalty for the “frivolous appeal.”305
Regardless of whether the state’s public policy prohibits the
enforcement of gambling debts, the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the U.S. Constitution requires all states to enforce judgments
from sister states so long as the state had proper personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.  Thus, it seems that one seeking to en-
force a gambling debt should first obtain a judgment in the state
where the debt was legally incurred, and then seek to enforce that
judgment in the debtor’s state.
IV. DIRECT LITIGATION
In some circumstances, courts may enforce a gambling debt
when a casino brings an action directly in the debtor’s home state,
instead of first obtaining a judgment in the state where the gam-
bling debt was legally incurred.  In Intercontinental Hotels v.
Golden,306 the defendant incurred twelve thousand dollars in gam-
bling debts at a Puerto Rican casino where gambling was legal.307
The casino sued the defendant in New York.308  The appellate
court reversed the trial court judgment allowing recovery, holding
that state public policy prohibited the enforcement of gambling
debts, even those incurred legally.309  The dissent argued for the
enforcement of the debt, reasoning that judicial process should not
be denied to one seeking to enforce a gambling debt when the debt
was valid where incurred.  The dissent opined that state public
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Id. at 776-77.
306 233 N.Y.S.2d 96 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962), rev’d, 238 N.Y.S.2d 33 (N.Y. App. Div. 1963),
rev’d, 203 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 1964).
307 Intercontinental Hotels, 233 N.Y.2d at 97.
308 Id.
309 Intercontinental Hotels, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 38-39.
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policy does not absolutely prohibit gaming, as evinced by the exis-
tence of legal horse racing and bingo.310
The highest court of New York reversed the appellate court,
and reinstated the decision of the trial court.311  The court’s deci-
sion emphasized the evolving opinion in New York which “indi-
cate[s] that the New York public does not consider authorized
gambling a violation of ‘some prevalent conception of good morals
[or], some deep-rooted tradition of the common weal.’”312  The
court further opined that this changing attitude was particularly
true of legal gambling, where enforcement would not create moral
problems because the state still prohibited gambling.313  Moreover,
the court held that it could apply Puerto Rican law, which allows a
court to use its discretion to reduce excessive gambling debts.314
Finally, the court emphasized the immorality of allowing New
York citizens to keep their winnings from legal gambling, but
avoid responsibility should they lose.315
Other courts have adopted the reasoning of Intercontinental
Hotels.  For example, in Robinson Property Group v. Russell,316 the
Tennessee appellate court reversed a trial court summary judg-
ment on behalf of the debtor, who allegedly owed over twenty-
three thousand dollars to a casino in Mississippi where gambling
is legal.317  The appellate court determined that the cash advance-
ments were for gambling purposes rather than a loan.318  The
court further noted that in Mississippi, gambling debts are en-
forceable if incurred legally.319  The court cited the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and stressed that full faith
and credit should be given not only to sister-state judgments, but
also to the public acts of each state.320  Adopting the reasoning of
Intercontinental Hotels, the court stated:
310 Id. at 42 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
311 Intercontinental Hotels, 203 N.E.2d at 214.
312 Id. at 213 (quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918)) (alteration
in original).
313 Id.  Occasionally, a New York decision will erroneously cite the intermediate appel-
late reasoning in Intercontinental Hotels, and ignore the reasoning of New York’s highest
court.  For example, in People v. World Interactive Gaming Corp., 185 Misc. 2d 852 (N.Y.
1999), the state obtained an injunction against a New York Internet gambling company,
essentially for stock fraud and related matters.  In dicta, the court stated that New York’s
constitution “contains an express prohibition against any kind of gambling not authorized
by the state legislature.  The prohibition represents a deep-rooted policy of the state
against unauthorized gambling.” Id. at 846 (citations omitted).  This comment ignored the
reasoning by New York’s highest court on public policy.
314 Intercontinental Hotels, 203 N.E.2d at 213.
315 Id.
316 No. W2000-00331-COA-R3-CV, 2000 WL 3313137 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2000).
317 Id. at *1.
318 Id. at *2.
319 Id. at *3.
320 Id. at *4.
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We too find that it would be a great injustice if Tennesseans
could reap the benefits of gambling in states where it is legal
when they are successful, but seek shelter in Tennessee courts
when they lose. As a result, we conclude that there is nothing in
the Mississippi laws in question that outrages the public policy
of Tennessee. Therefore, the gaming contract between the par-
ties is enforceable in Tennessee.321
The reasoning of Intercontinental Hotels has also been applied
to the registration of judgments from foreign countries.  In As-
pinall’s Club Ltd. v. Aryeh,322 a licensed London casino obtained a
default judgment against a New York debtor.323  When the casino
attempted to collect on the judgment in a New York Court, Aryeh
argued that New York public policy prohibited enforcement of the
debt.324  Even though the court was not compelled to enforce the
judgment under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, the court
granted the club’s motion, in part, based on the reasoning of Inter-
continental Hotels.325  The court explained, “Gambling in legalized
and appropriately supervised forms is not against this state’s pub-
lic policy.”326
Some states, however, have not extended the reasoning of In-
tercontinental Hotels and Arace to the direct litigation of a foreign
debt.  In Casanova Club v. Bisharat,327 the Connecticut Supreme
Court affirmed summary judgment for a bettor who failed to pay a
gambling debt incurred while wagering at a licensed London ca-
sino.328  The casino argued that Connecticut should reexamine its
public policy in light of its state-sanctioned lottery and judicial de-
cisions in other states allowing the enforcement of legal out-of-
state gambling debts.329  While the court recognized that the state
had legalized some forms of gambling, none of theses statutes al-
321 Id.
322 86 A.D.2d 428 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
323 Id. at 431.
324 Id.
325 Id. at 433.
326 Id.
327 458 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1983).
328 Id. at 1-2.  A similar result was reached in Condado Aruba Caribbean Hotel, N.V. v.
Tickel, 561 P.2d 23 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977), where the Colorado Appellate Court refused to
enforce a $14,500 gambling debt incurred in Aruba, where gambling is legal. Id. at 24.
329 The court said the result would have been different had the casino sought to enforce
a British judgment for the gambling debt. Casanova Club, 458 A.2d at 4 (citing Hilton
International Co. v. Arace, 394 A.2d 739, 742-44 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1977)).  In addition, the
court indicated that the result in Casanova Club may have been different:
[If the casino had] properly invoked the statutory proviso that protects the validity
of any negotiable instrument held by any person who acquired the same for value
and in good faith without notice of illegality in the consideration.  Although in its
appellate brief the plaintiff maintains that there could be no notice of illegality to
taint the negotiability and enforceability of the checks, the [plaintiff did not raise
absence of notice in any of its pleadings] in the trial court.
Casanova Club, 458 A.2d at 3 (internal quotations omitted).
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lowed the extension of credit; thus, the state public policy had not
truly changed.330  In addition, the court acknowledged that the
Second Restatement on the Conflict of Laws could support the en-
forcement of legally obtained gambling debts.331  However, the
court indicated that it lacked the factual basis to apply the criteria
in the Restatement.332  Thus, the court held that gambling debts,
however obtained, are unenforceable in Connecticut.333
Likewise, the Virginia courts have refused to allow suits to
recover gambling debts, even if incurred in a state where such
gambling is legal.  In Resorts International Hotel, Inc. v.
Agresta,334 the plaintiff sued on a ten thousand dollar note result-
ing from a failure to pay legal New Jersey gambling debts.335  The
court concluded that even though the gambler did not attempt to
defend the action, the laws and public policy of Virginia will not
permit suits to recover gambling debts.336
In Texas, gambling debts remain unenforceable.337  Texas has
also refused to allow direct litigation of a gambling debt, even
though the debt was legally incurred in another jurisdiction.  One
Texas gambler, George J. Aubin, appears to have learned to use
his state’s unwillingness to enforce gambling debts to his advan-
tage.  In 1969, Aubin was sued for failure to pay on promissory
notes issued to him by Louis Hunsucker.338  Viewing the promis-
sory notes as gambling debts, the court ruled that they were unen-
330 Id. at 4.
331 Id.  The Restatement Second of Conflict of Laws provides:
Law Governing in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the princi-
ples stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the con-
tracts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the
law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of busi-
ness of the parties.  “These contracts are to be evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue.”
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in the
same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as otherwise
provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
332 Casanova Club, 458 A.2d at 5.
333 Id. The court noted, however, that if the casino had first obtained a judgment in
Great Britain, the court would have permitted recovery based on Arace. Id. at 4.
334 Resorts Int’l Hotel, Inc. v. Agresta, 569 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Va. 1983).
335 Id. at 25.
336 Id. at 26.
337 Carnival Leisure Indus., Ltd. v. Aubin, 938 F.2d 624 (5th Cir. 1991), remanded to
830 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1993); rev’d, 53 F.3d 716 (5th Cir. 1995).
338 Aubin v. Hunsucker, 481 S.W.2d 952, 953 (Tex. App. 1972).
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forceable under Texas law.339  Then, in 1987, Aubin accrued
twenty-five thousand dollars in gambling debts while vacationing
in the Bahamas.340  When he refused to honor the drafts, the ca-
sino commenced litigation in the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas.341
While granting the casino’s summary judgment motion,342 the
trial court did not make a determination as to whether the debts
were legal under Bahamian law.343  The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit reversed the trial court.344  The court stated that
Texas statutes permitting some forms of gambling would “hardly
introduce a judicially cognizable change in public policy with re-
spect to gambling generally.”345  Furthermore, even if legislation
had changed, “such a shift would not be inconsistent with a con-
tinued public policy disfavoring gambling on credit.”346
On remand, the trial court opined that public policy against
enforcing the debt, relied on by the appellate court, had changed.
The court stated, “Asserting a sweeping public policy against gam-
bling is anachronistic.  If there really was a policy, it is totally de-
funct.”347  The trial court then employed a different strategy to
find Aubin liable for the debts.  Determining that the instruments
issued by the casino were negotiable instruments and not gam-
bling debts, the court found Aubin liable under a theory of fraud
because he “never intended to honor the drafts.”348
339 Id. at 957.
340 Carnival, 938 F.2d at 624.
341 Id.
342 Id.
343 Id. at 625 n.2.  The Court of Appeal stated:
The district court looked solely to Texas law and made no determination of Baha-
mian law.  Neither party challenges the district court’s choice of Texas law in this
case.  We therefore do not rule on the question of whether the law of the Bahamas
should have been applied or whether its application would require enforcement of
Aubin’s debt.  Neither party has provided evidence (or requested judicial notice) as
to Bahamian law or as to whether gambling is legal or whether gambling debts are
legally enforceable in the Bahamas.  It is noteworthy, however, that the Texas
Supreme Court has stated that where collection of the gambling debt entails the
cashing of a check (inferentially of a Texas resident) on a Texas bank, Texas courts
apply Texas law.
Id. (citations omitted).
344 Id. at 626.
345 Id. at 625.
346 Id. at 626.  Judge Vela concurred in what he considered a most inequitable result,
stating, “The result here may be legally justified, however it sends out a poor message to
would be gamblers.  Go on credit and the House takes the risk.  Aubin had profited from a
similar exception in Aubin v. Hunsucker, and once again avoids an obligation which was
knowingly made.” Id. at 627 (Vela, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
347 Carnival Leisure Indus., Ltd. v. Aubin, 830 F. Supp. 371, 374  (S.D. Tex. 1993).
348 Id. at 375-77.  The court added:
Seasoned gamblers are shrewd manipulators.  They know which debts are enforce-
able.  An anachronistic public policy and misguided case law that forbid legal casi-
nos from lawfully collecting commercial instruments and the debts arising from
them will eventually force collection efforts underground.  While it may save mor-
alistic posturing, it may cost knee-caps.
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Once again, the Court of Appeals reversed,349 stating:
For us to allow recovery against Aubin on an otherwise unen-
forceable gambling debt under a theory of fraud, when in fact
the only real allegation of misrepresentation was that Aubin
signed the markers knowing they were unenforceable in his
home state (by operation of law), would require that we recog-
nize an exception to Texas public policy that does not exist.350
In Illinois, the law is unclear whether a legal gambling debt
incurred in another state can be directly sued upon within the
state.  In Resorts International, Inc., v. Zonis,351 a federal court sit-
ting in diversity refused to allow recovery of a twenty-five thou-
sand dollar gambling debt in an action brought by a New Jersey
casino, irrespective of whether Illinois or New Jersey law was ap-
plicable.352  The court held that Illinois public policy precluded re-
covery regardless of which state’s law was applicable.353
The federal court’s reasoning in Zonis was criticized by the
Illinois Appellate Court in Cie v. Comdata Network, Inc.354  In Cie,
the plaintiff used the defendant’s services for cash advances on a
credit card to bet on races at Illinois race tracks and to gamble at a
Nevada casino.355  The court held that the cash advance was not
an unlawful gambling enterprise because the transaction between
the plaintiff and defendant was not a wager.356  The court found
further support for its holding in a 1991 statutory change that
eliminated previous lender liability for loan money that the lender
knew would be used for gambling.357  While the court specifically
rejected the analysis in Zonis,358 the Illinois Supreme Court has
not yet addressed the question.
Unlike the mere registration of sister-state judgments, recov-
ery through direct lawsuits on out-of-state gambling debts is less
certain.  Some states clearly allow direct lawsuits, some clearly do
not, and in at least one there is no clear answer.  Because of this
uncertainty, it is safer for a creditor—looking to recover on a debt
incurred in another state—to first seek a judgment in the state
where the debt was incurred.
Id. at 377-78.
349 Carnival Leisure Indus., Ltd. v. Aubin, 53 F.3d 716, 720 (5th Cir. 1995).
350 Id. at 719.
351 577 F. Supp. 876 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
352 Id. at 877.
353 Id.
354 656 N.E.2d 123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
355 Id. at 125.
356 Id.
357 Id. at 126 (citing 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/28-7(a) (1994)).
358 Id. at 129.
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V. CONCLUSION
The enforceability of a gambling debt depends on the laws of
the particular state in which one is attempting to enforce the debt.
All states in the Union, influenced by the historical traditions
against gambling, have started from the premise that gambling
debts are unenforceable.  Nevertheless, over time states have be-
gun a slow process of legalizing gambling, which will eventually
lead to the enforcement of gambling-related debts.  In general, it
appears that the greater the extent of legalized gambling in a
state, the more likely it is that the state has changed its laws to
allow enforcement.  Each state has found different ways to handle
the costs and benefits of legalized gambling.  Additionally, the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution requires
every state to enforce a judgment from a sister state, regardless of
the underlying merits of the case.  Thus, as long as the gambling
debt was legally made and the proper procedures were used, every
state in the Union should enforce the debt.
The appendix to this article provides an international survey
of gambling debt enforcement law, which is interesting to compare
and contrast to the U.S. system.  Other countries have found dif-
ferent solutions to the problem of gambling related debts, and
have confronted issues that have yet to be litigated in the United
States.
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Appendix:
An International Survey of Gambling
Debt Enforcement Law
I. INTRODUCTION
This appendix provides an international survey of the en-
forcement of gambling debts.  Like U.S. law, gambling debt en-
forcement laws of many other countries have been influenced by
the Statute of Anne and Roman law.  This appendix is intended to
provide additional context and issues for discussion in the U.S.
debate over the treatment of gambling debts; it is not an exhaus-
tive analysis of the laws of each of these countries.  Any person
who wishes to enforce a gambling debt in a foreign country should,
of course, first consult with counsel licensed in that country.
II. GREAT BRITAIN
A. England
England has a long tradition of prohibiting the extension of
credit for gaming.  The Statute of Anne, passed in 1710, voided all
financial agreements where gaming or wagering was an element
of the consideration for the contract.359  The statute also voided all
agreements to repay gaming debts.360  While the Statute of Anne
remains the cornerstone of British law concerning gaming debt
enforcement, Parliament’s subsequent passage of a number of
gaming acts has expanded and defined the practice of gambling
debt enforcement.  The Gaming Acts that remain relevant to mod-
ern British law were passed in 1835, 1845, 1892, and 1968.361
The Gaming Act of 1835 changed the status of contracts that
arose from gaming.362  Rather than the contracts being completely
void, as under the Statute of Anne, the contracts were considered
to have been given for illegal consideration.363  A contract that is
given for illegal consideration is neither enforceable by the origi-
nal parties to the contract, nor enforceable by a third party pur-
359 An Act for the Better Preventing of Excessive and Deceitful Gaming, 1710, 9 Ann. c.
14, §§ 1, 2, 4 (Eng.) [hereinafter Statute of Anne].
360 Id.
361 See Gaming Act, 1968, c. 65, Pt. II, § 16(4) (Eng.).  The Gaming Act of 1968 reaf-
firms the validity of the previous Gaming Acts, but preempts the application of the acts to
the practice of accepting checks in exchange for tokens to be used for gaming or other ca-
sino purchases.
362 Gaming Act, 1835, 5 Will. 4, c. 41, § 1 (Eng.).
363 Ladup Ltd. v. Shaikh, 1983 Q.B. 225, at Judgment 1 ¶ 25 (McCowan, J.).
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chaser if he or she has notice of the nature of the debt.364  This
change protected innocent third party purchasers because a third
party who purchased the note without notice of the nature of the
debt could enforce the contract.365
The Gaming Act of 1845 reaffirmed the invalidity of gaming
debts expressed in the Statute of Anne stating, “all contracts or
agreements, whether by parole or in writing, by way of gaming or
wagering, shall be null and void.”366  Nevertheless, the Act re-
pealed the recovery provisions of the Statute of Anne, thereafter
prohibiting such suits.367  However, the 1845 Act contains an im-
portant exception reminiscent of Roman law.  The 1845 Act specif-
ically excludes any wagers on a “lawful game, sport, pastime, or
exercise.”368  The Gaming Act of 1892 enlarged the scope of the
1845 Act by providing that any promise to pay on a contract “ren-
dered null and void by the Gaming Act of 1845” was void.369
English courts strictly interpreted the Gaming Act of 1845 to
void contracts that arose from gambling activities.  In Hill v. Wil-
liam Hill (Park Lane) Ld.,370 a bettor lost money and the matter
was reported to a committee of Tattersalls.371  The bettor was then
informed that if payments were not made, the bettor would be
posted as a defaulter, which would effectively prevent him from
further gambling on horse racing.372  The basic issue faced by the
Hill court was whether the decision in Hyams v. Stuart King,373
which allowed recovery by a party who agreed to forgo suit in ex-
change for repayment of a debt, should be followed.374  Four Law
Lords in Hill found in favor of the bettor and overruled Hyams
largely based their decisions on the Hyams dissent.375  Particu-
larly persuasive was the dissent’s analysis of the clear language
and legislative history of the Gaming Act of 1845.376
English courts have also interpreted the Statute of Anne and
the Gaming Acts of 1835, 1845, and 1892, strictly in an attempt to
364 Id.
365 Id.
366 Gaming Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 109, § 18 (Eng.).
367 Id.
368 Id.
369 Gaming Act, 1892, 55 Vict., c. 9, § 1 (Eng.).  The 1892 Act also made it illegal for
casinos to charge fees or commissions as a prerequisite for allowing patrons to gamble. Id.
370 [1949] A.C. 530 (Eng. C.A.).
371 Id. at 531.  The committee of Tattersalls governs the settlement of bets when a
situation arises that is not covered by a particular betting rule.  For example, “bets on
horseracing are historically governed by ‘Tattersalls’ Rules of Betting.”  Cheltenham Festi-
val 2002, Betting Rules: Tattersalls’ Rules, available at http://www.cheltenham-festival-
betting.com/betting_rules1.htm.
372 Hill, [1949] A.C. at 531.
373 2 K.B. 696 (1908).
374 Hill, [1949] A.C. 544.
375 Hyams, 2 K.B. at 711-23.
376 Id. at 712-13.
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eliminate schemes that seek to circumvent the prohibition on ex-
tensions of credit.  An example of a scheme to circumvent prohibi-
tions on the extension of credit may be found in C.H.T. Ltd. v.
Ward.377  In Ward, the Crockfords Club operated a legal poker
club.378  Gamblers purchased chips on their club accounts, which
could then be used either for betting or for purchasing food and
drinks at the club.379  A winning bettor could either receive cash
when redeeming his chips, or deposit the winnings in his account
for future use.380  Losers were billed weekly.381  In Ward, the defen-
dant failed to pay, and the club sued to recover the debt.  The
Crockfords Club argued that the chips were a loan made in a form
of private currency, and not subject to the prohibition against ex-
tension of credit.382  The court rejected this argument as illogical,
holding that gamblers sought to win money, not chips, and that
chips were not private currency, but a convenient symbol for ac-
cepted public currency.383  Thus, the agreements between the Club
and its patrons were unenforceable.
Parliament strengthened the prohibition against extending
credit for gaming when it passed section 16 of the Gaming Act of
1968 (“the Act”).384  The Act prohibits any gaming license holder or
employee of a license holder from making loans or extending
credit for the purposes of “(a) enabling any person to take part in
the gaming, or (b) in respect of any losses incurred by any person
in the gaming.”385  However, section 16 of the Act does allow casi-
nos to accept checks in exchange for gaming tokens if certain crite-
ria are satisfied.386  Under the Act, a licensed casino is allowed to
accept a check on the conditions that it is not postdated, it is ex-
changed for either cash or tokens,387 and it is presented for pay-
377 2 Q.B. 63 (Eng. C.A. 1965).
378 Id. at 65.
379 Id. at 64.
380 Id.
381 Id. at 65.
382 Id. at 79.
383 Id.
384 Gaming Act, 1968, c. 65, Pt. II, § 16(1) (Eng.).
385 Id.
386 Id. § 16(2).
387 Id. § 16(1)-(2).  Section 16(1) provides:
[W]here gaming to which this Part of this Act applies takes place on premises in
respect of which a licence under this Act is for the time being in force, neither the
holder of the licence nor any person acting on his behalf or under any arrangement
with him shall make any loan or otherwise provide or allow to any person any
credit, or release, or discharge on another person’s behalf, the whole or part of any
debt,—
(a)  for enabling any person to take part in the gaming, or
(b)  in respect of any losses incurred by any person in the gaming.
Id. § 16(1). Section 16(2) reads:
Neither the holder of the licence nor any person acting on his behalf or under any
arrangement with him shall accept a cheque and give in exchange for it cash or
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ment within two banking days.388  In 1986, the Act was amended
to allow a gambler to exchange his or her winnings for that day for
checks the gambler cashed at the casino earlier that same day.389
The gambler may also write one large check and redeem it for all
other checks written that same day, so long as the one check cov-
ers all the previously cashed checks.390  In 1997, the Act was again
amended to allow a gambler to purchase tokens using a debit
card.391
Allowing gaming licensees to cash checks under the Act has
had important consequences for the growth of gaming in England
and the development of British gambling debt enforcement law.
The growth of gaming in England to a billion dollar industry is at
least partly attributable to the exemption that allows licensees to
cash patrons’ checks.392  More importantly, for this discussion, the
exemption has raised questions regarding when check cashing be-
comes an extension of credit, and whether licensees can reduce
gamblers’ debts by compromising checks that have been previ-
ously cashed.
In R. v. Crown Court at Knightsbridge, ex parte Marcrest,
Ltd.,393 the court dealt with the issue of when check cashing con-
stitutes an extension of credit.394  In Marcrest, the appellate court
upheld a lower court decision to revoke the casino’s gaming license
for repeated violations of gaming regulations, including the un-
lawful extension of credit.395  The casino granted unlawful credit
in several ways:  by accepting house check forms that were never
deposited; by sending checks to the licensee’s head office in order
to maintain the fiction of compliance with section 16(3); by ac-
cepting “sham” checks from patrons whose previous checks were
dishonored and the casino management knew that checks from
tokens for enabling any person to take part in the gaming unless the following
conditions are fulfilled, that is to say—
(a)  the cheque is not a post-dated cheque, and
(b)  it is exchanged for cash to an amount equal to the amount for which it is
drawn, or is exchanged for tokens at the same rate as would apply if cash, to the
amount for which the cheque is drawn, were given in exchange for them . . . .
Id. § 16(2).
388 Id. § 16(3).  Section 16(3) states:
Where the holder of a license under this Act, or a person acting on behalf of or
under any arrangement with the holder of such a licence, accepts a cheque in ex-
change for cash or tokens to be used by a player in gaming to which this Part of
this Act applies, or a substitute cheque, he shall not more than two banking days
later cause the cheque to be delivered to a bank for payment or collection.
Id.
389 Gaming Act, 1968, c. 65, Pt. II, § 16(2A)(a) (Eng.) (amended 1986).
390 Id.
391 Id. (amended 1997).
392 Neil Fagan, Enforcement of Gaming Debts in Britain, 8 N.Y.L SCH. J. INT’L & COMP.
L. 7, 14 (1986).
393 1 All E.R. 1148 (Eng. C.A. 1983).
394 Id. at 1155.
395 Id. at 1157-58.
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those patrons would not be honored on first presentation; by
marking house checks with a bank where the casino knew the
gambler did not maintain an account; and by giving gamblers
credit at the tables.396  The casino’s practices were in clear viola-
tion of the language and intent of section 16, which “is to protect
punters against themselves . . . [because] [t]hey are not to be given
by the casinos so much rope that they may eventually hang them-
selves, figuratively or otherwise.”397
Especially interesting is the court’s discussion of what consti-
tutes a “sham” check.  The court explained that in order for a doc-
ument to be a “sham” both parties must have intended the
document not to create the legal rights and obligations that it pur-
ports to create.398  Marcrest’s dealings with its customers consti-
tuted a “sham” because neither the casino, nor the gambler
believed the checks would be honored on first presentation.399
Rather, the function of the checks was to memorialize a debt to
the casino.400
Marcrest also dealt with the issue of whether acceptance of a
check for less than the value of a dishonored check gives rise to a
gambling debt in violation of section 16.401  As the court explained,
customers who gamble with cash, or trade cash for chips, do not
incur a debt with the casino because, once the customer loses the
chips, he or she owes the casino no further obligation.402  A debt
can only lawfully arise when a customer cashes a check in ex-
change for cash or tokens, and the check is subsequently dishon-
ored, leaving the gambler in debt to the casino.403  On this issue,
the court stated, “[W]hen the cheque is given by the customer to
enable him to take part in the gaming, and is subsequently
dishonoured, then prima facie a debt has been incurred in respect
of losses in the gaming.”404
Section 16 has been interpreted to require that once a debt is
incurred as a result of a dishonored check, a casino must seek full
payment of the amount of the check.  The casino is placed in the
position of a creditor, in violation of section 16, if it allows the
gambler to pay in installments, or it agrees to compromise the
debt for a lesser amount.405  This interpretation of section 16
places casinos in a difficult position because they cannot negotiate
396 Id. at 1153.
397 Id. at 1154.
398 Id.
399 Id.
400 Id.
401 Id.
402 Id. at 1154-55.
403 Id. at 1155.
404 Id.
405 Id.
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a settlement for anything less than the full amount of a dishon-
ored check.406  The solicitors in Marcrest argued that under this
interpretation, casinos would suffer serious losses, which could be
mitigated by a compromise of the bad debts.407  The court was
somewhat sympathetic; nevertheless, it upheld the strict interpre-
tation of section 16 because encouraging licensees to limit patron
losses is consistent with the policy of the statute.408
On a practical level, this interpretation of section 16 requires
licensees who accept checks that are later dishonored to seek a
court judgment on the entire amount of the dishonored check.
Only after receiving judgment on the entire amount can the licen-
see negotiate a compromise of the judgment.409  While trial courts
will apply the rules discussed above, there appears to be some
flexibility in gambling debt enforcement.
For example, in 1991, Ritz Casino Limited sued international
arms dealer Adnan Khashoggi for £3.2 million plus interest for
dishonored checks cashed at hotel casinos during a period of ex-
tensive gaming in 1986.410  Khashoggi defended against the suit by
claiming the debt was unenforceable because the casino allowed
him to continue gaming by illegally extending credit.411  The par-
ties settled the case for an undisclosed sum, and Khashoggi’s
counsel said that Khashoggi “withdraws any suggestion that the
Ritz acted improperly or in contravention of the Gaming Act
1968.”412  The judge in the case appeared relieved that he did not
have to hear the case, stating that he was “very happy to hear that
[the case had settled] because it seemed to me pre-eminently an
action which was better compromised on acceptable terms than
fought to a finish.  It had quite a few complexities and wrin-
kles.”413  Despite the litigation, Khashoggi continues to be a wel-
come casino patron, but the casino is no longer willing to cash his
checks.414
Although the extension of credit is illegal in England, foreign
judgments on gambling debts may be enforced, provided the debts
were legally incurred in the foreign jurisdiction.415  Courts inter-
pret the Gaming Acts of 1845 and 1892 as applying only to gaming
406 Id.
407 Id.
408 Id.
409 Fagan, supra note 392, at 17.
410 Ritz Casino Ltd. v. Khashoggi, (Eng. Mar. 26, 1996) (LEXIS Country & Region,
United Kingdom, UK cases, combined courts), at Judgment 1 ¶ 1 (Thorpe, L.J.).
411 Mike Taylor, Khashoggi Settles his Pounds 8m Gambling Debt with Casino, BIR-
MINGHAM POST, June 6, 1998, available at 1998 WL 22710784.
412 Id.
413 Id.
414 Casino Refuses to Gamble in the Game of PR, BELFAST NEWS LETTER, June 4, 1998,
available at 1998 WL 27604391.
415 See generally Fagan, supra note 392, at 18-19.
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that is unlawful in England.416  Therefore, English courts will ac-
commodate foreign law by enforcing judgments that are lawful in
those jurisdictions.417  In order to enforce a foreign judgment in
English courts, creditors must show that the English courts have
jurisdiction over the debtor.418  The courts have jurisdiction when:
1) the debtor has been served with legal process within the United
Kingdom; 2) the debtor is domiciled or an “ordinary resident” in
the United Kingdom; 3) the breach of the gaming contract was
committed within the jurisdiction of the English courts; or 4) the
debtor voluntarily submits to the English court’s jurisdiction.419
Creditors most often assert the second and third bases for jurisdic-
tion, and it is clearly advantageous to pursue a U.K. resident in
English courts because it is likely the debtor will have assets in
the country.420
While the Gaming Act of 1968’s prohibition against extending
credit for gaming remains in effect, there is some indication of
changing policy.  The 2001 Gambling Review Report, produced by
the Department for Culture, Media and Sport, recommended that
Parliament relax the prohibition by making “all gambling debts”
legally enforceable.421  According to the Report, such a change in
policy would eliminate anomalies, such as the enforceability of
debts arising from spread betting and the “palpable error rule.”422
Until Parliament makes changes similar to those recommended in
the Gaming Review Report, English gaming debt enforcement law
will remain complex.
B. Scotland
In Scotland, “the common law . . . on gaming and wagering
differs greatly from the common law of England.  In Scotland it is
settled law that wagering agreements, being ‘sponsiones ludicrae,’
416 Id. at 19.
417 Id.
418 Id.
419 Id.
420 Id.  Creditors may also seek injunctions in English courts against the assets of debt-
ors.  These injunctions freeze the debtor’s assets within the country so the creditor can
enforce any judgment granted by English courts. Id. at 22-23.
421 Gambling Review Body, Department for Culture, Media and Sport, Gambling Re-
view Report § 26.25 (July 2001), available at http:// www.culture.gov.uk/PDF/
gambling_review_chapter26.pdf.
422 Id.  The “palpable error rule” allows a licensee to deny payment of winnings when
an employee makes a mistake in the betting transaction. Id.  This rule has led to inequities
such as the case of a bettor who won £259,000 but was unable to collect because the sports-
book manager did not make a photographic record of the bet.  Richard Colbey, A Debt of
Dishonour Gambling Liabilities Are Not Legally Recoverable, GUARDIAN (London), Nov. 28,
1998, available at 1998 WL 18679969.  The bettor was prevented from pursuing his action
in court under the Gaming Act of 1845. Id. The decision by the court was somewhat anom-
alous because the bettor would have been able to recover had his bet been part of a betting
pool or had he bet against a point spread. Id.
130 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 5:87
are matters with which the court ought not to occupy itself.”423
The courts’ refusal to hear gambling debt cases under this doc-
trine has resulted in harsh outcomes.  In County Properties and
Developments Ltd. v. Harper,424 the Sheriff’s Court faced a casino
seeking to recover an alleged overpayment of two thousand
pounds on a winning wager.425  The casino argued that laws, such
as the Gaming Act of 1968, involved constables and local authori-
ties in gaming matters, and therefore, it is inconsistent to say the
matter is “beneath the dignity of the courts’ consideration.”426
While the court was impressed with the casino’s argument, it re-
fused to enforce the debt.427
An even harsher result was reached in Ferguson v. Lit-
tlewoods Pools, Ltd.428  In that case, five members of a football pool
reportedly won £2.3 million, only to have a pool agent abscond
with the money.429  When the winners sued the pool organizers,
the defendant argued that the doctrine of sponsio ludicra ap-
plied.430  Lord Coulsfield agreed that the doctrine barred the ac-
tion and dismissed the case.431  The plaintiffs reportedly appealed
to the Court of Five Judges, but could not afford to continue; the
matter was resolved in a confidential settlement that did not re-
quire Littlewoods to make any financial payment.432
In a ruling that is “thought to be the first of its kind in Scot-
land,”433 the Glasgow Court of Session enforced a wagering debt in
Robertson v. Anderson.434  The plaintiff’s suit alleged that her best
friend had promised to split a bingo jackpot with her.435  Lord
Carloway, convinced that there was an oral agreement, ques-
tioned the continuing validity of the sponsio ludicra defense.436  He
concluded that betting had become so prevalent in the country,
with the state even sponsoring a lottery, that the rule no longer
423 Hill v. William Hill (Park Lane), [1949] A.C. 530, 567-68 (Eng. C.A.) (citing Robert-
son v. Balfour, 1938 Sess. Cas. 207).
424 1989 S.C.L.R. 597.
425 Id. at 599.
426 Id. at 598.
427 Id. at 599.
428 9 Scots L. Times 309 (Outer House Ct. of Sess. 1996), available at 1996 WL
1104215.
429 Id. at 310; Bruce Mckain, Littlewoods Asks Judge to Follow Tradition and Reject
Syndicate’s Claim Over Gambling Debt; Five Sue After £2.3m Jackpot Loss, HERALD (Glas-
gow), Mar. 15, 1996, at 9.
430 Ferguson, 9 Scots L. Times. at 310.
431 Id. at 314, 315.
432 Hector L. MacQueen, Football Pools and Sponsiones Ludicrae, SCOTS L. NEWS,
available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/sln/index.asp?page=13.
433 Bruce Mckain, Bingo Winner Ordered to Share; Judge Awards £54,000 to Friend,
HERALD (Glasgow), May 16, 2001, at 5.
434 Robertson v. Anderson, at ¶ 73 (Outer House Ct. of Sess. May 15, 2001), available
at http://www.scotcourts.gov.uk/opinions/CAR0905.html.
435 Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
436 Id. ¶¶ 71-72.
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seemed valid.437  While he suggested a reconsideration of sponsio
ludicra, Lord Carloway based his decision on the fact that the
agreement was not a gambling contract but a collateral agree-
ment.438  Lord Carloway awarded the plaintiff half the winnings
and interest at eight percent from the date the prize was won.439
Scottish law, unlike English law, completely prevents courts
from addressing gambling claims.  However, recent decisions sug-
gest that Scottish courts may soon move away from strict prohibi-
tion towards a rule favoring enforcement.
III. AUSTRALIA
Traditionally casinos would negotiate payment arrangements
with defaulting foreign gamblers hailing from Far Eastern coun-
tries, such as Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia.440
However, it has recently become customary for casinos to utilize
private investigators to find and take legal action against default-
ing gamblers.441  This practice is ordinarily used only when negoti-
ations for payments fail.442  Interestingly, the courts have
determined that if a gambler uses a check at an Australian casino,
and the check was drawn by a Hong Kong resident, on a Hong
Kong bank, the jurisdiction would not be Australia, where the
gambling took place, but rather Hong Kong.443
It has been reported that the Burswood Casino, in Western
Australia, recently initiated proceedings to sue six Malaysians to
recover over one million dollars (Austl.) in gambling debts, as well
as a seventh Malaysian “highroller,” who alone owes over two mil-
lion dollars (Austl.), including interest.444  The largest individual
debt exclusive of interest, $2.05 million (Austl.), was reportedly
settled when a Malaysian Member of Parliament agreed to pay in
installments.445  After legal proceedings were initiated, one of the
remaining defendants, a lawyer from Klang, was reportedly mak-
437 Id. ¶ 71.
438 Id. ¶¶ 71-72.
439 Id. ¶ 73; Hector L. MacQueen, Sponsiones Ludricae and Bingo Winning Agree-
ments, SCOTS L. NEWS, available at http://www.law.ed.ac.uk/sin/index.asp?page=111.
440 Neville D’Cruz, Casino Takes Legal Action Against Malaysians, MALAY. GEN. NEWS,
July 1, 1998.
441 Ruth Mathewson, Casinos Hunt HK Punters Over Huge Gambling Debts, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, June 14, 1998, at 3.
442 Id.
443 Id.
444 D’Cruz, supra note 440; Peter Klinger, Casino Bid to Recoup $2M from High Roller,
AUSTRALASIAN BUS. INTELLIGENCE: THE W. AUSTRALIAN, Jan. 11, 2001, at P3, available at
2001 WL 2300888.
445 Australian Casino Drops Plan to Sue Malaysian MP, AAP NEWSFEED, June 11,
1998.
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ing arrangements to settle his debt of up to one million dollars
(Austl.).446
In Australia, two recent cases, which made their way through
the courts simultaneously, both involved gamblers seeking to re-
cover monies lost while gambling.447  In both cases the gamblers
claimed that they were problem gamblers and that the casinos
should be held liable for their losses.  The state of the law remains
in flux on this issue, given that the two cases had opposite
outcomes.
In Am. Express Int’l v. Famularo,448 an unsuccessful gambler
sought to avoid paying $88,300.97 (Austl.) to American Express
(AMEX).449  When AMEX sued him for that amount, Famularo not
only counter-claimed against AMEX, but also cross-claimed
against the hotel where he had gambled.450  The gambler allegedly
obtained cash advances on his AMEX card, totaling $67,777.50
(Austl.), on 226 occasions.451  The hotel and AMEX had a contract,
which prohibited the hotel from allowing credit card use for gam-
bling purposes, and placed a burden on the hotel to ensure that
cash advances obtained by AMEX customers would not be used for
gambling.452  The agreement also provided that the merchant was
required to follow all applicable laws.453  The hotel had allegedly
failed to comply with the Liquor Act of 1982, which states that it is
a “condition of a hotelier’s license that the licensee is not to pro-
vide a cash advance in the hotel, or permit or suffer a cash ad-
vance to be provided in the hotel on behalf of the licensee.”454
The counter-claim against AMEX was dismissed because
AMEX had no notice of the wrongful conduct.455  However, the
gambler did succeed at trial on his cross-claim allegations that the
hotel’s conduct constituted misrepresentation and unconscionable
practice pursuant to the Trade Practices Act.456  Specifically, the
gambler claimed, and the court agreed, that he was a pathological
446 D’Cruz, supra note 440.
447 Am. Express Int’l v. Famularo, No. DCC1516 BG-G1, slip op. (D.N.S.W. Feb. 19,
2001) (on file with Chapman Law Review); Reynolds v. Katoomba RSL All Serv. Club Ltd.
(1999) 81-545 A. Tort R. 63,545 (D.N.S.W.), aff’d, Reynolds v. Katoomba RSL All Serv. Club
Ltd., No. CA 41030/99 (N.S.W. Ct. App. May 2, 2001), (LEXIS, International Materials,
Australia, New South Wales Unreported Judgments).
448 Famularo, No. DCC1516 BG-G1.
449 Id. at 1.
450 Id.
451 Id.
452 Id. at 3-4.
453 Id. at 4.
454 Id.; see also Liquor Act, 1982, N.S.W. ACTS § 20(4A) (2001).
455 Famularo, No. DCC1516 BG-G1, at 4-7.
456 Id. at 41.  The Trade Practices Act provides compensation to the victim of uncon-
scionable activity.  Id. at 3 (“Section 51AB(1) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) pro-
vides:  (1) A corporation shall not, in trade or commerce, in connection with the supply or
possible supply of goods or services to a person, engage in conduct that is, in all the circum-
stances, unconscionable.”).
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gambler, and that the hotel knew of his condition.457  The court
accepted the uncontradicted expert psychiatric testimony of Dr.
Clive Allcock that the gambler had serious problems with control-
ling his gambling, which were exacerbated by the gambler’s use of
alcohol.458  The gambler also proved to the court’s satisfaction that
hotel personnel told him that he could use cash advances from a
credit card to gamble.459  In fact, the hotel installed the AMEX ma-
chine in the gaming area of the hotel at the gambler’s request.460
The court held that the hotel acted with knowledge and with in-
tent to breach its agreement with AMEX, and to break the law.461
The Famularo court was successful in distinguishing an ear-
lier case, Reynolds v. Katoomba RSL All Services Club Ltd.462
Reynolds, a casino patron, sued the Katoomba Club for negligence
and unconscionable actions related to the his gambling losses.463
Specifically, Reynolds’s cause of action was based on an agree-
ment between the parties to prevent Reynolds from gambling at
the club.  Reynolds alleged that he was addicted to gambling and
had specifically asked the Katoomba Club to refuse to allow him to
gamble on credit, or allow his checks to be cashed.464  After several
months of honoring the agreement, Katoomba started allowing
Reynolds to gamble on credit.465  Ultimately, over a four-year pe-
riod, Reynolds gambled and lost $56,968.83 (Austl.).466
The trial court found that Reynolds was a problem gambler,
that the manager of the Katoomba Club should have been aware
of that fact, and that the club cashed Reynolds checks knowing he
would use the money for gambling.467  Nevertheless, the trial
judge concluded that Reynolds had free will, and should be held
responsible for his actions.468  Most importantly, the trial court
concluded that the Katoomba Club owed no duty to the gambler.
The court noted that no case had ever found a duty of care under
such circumstances, and declined to do so itself.469
The court in Famularo distinguished Reynolds on two
grounds.  First, in Famularo, the hotel made misrepresentations
457 Id. at 26, 31-35.
458 Id. at 34.
459 Id. at 19-20.
460 Id. at 16-17.
461 Id. at 41.
462 Reynolds v. Katoomba RSL All Serv. Club Ltd. (1999) 81-545 A. Tort R. 63,545
(D.N.S.W.).
463 Id.
464 Id. at 63,547.
465 Id. at 63,548.
466 Id. at 63,545.
467 Id. at 63,549.
468 Id.
469 Id. at 63,549-50.
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to the effect that the disputed cash advances were permitted.470
Second, in Famularo, the cash advances were illegal under the ex-
press provisions of the Liquor Act.471  The court ruled in favor of
AMEX, against the gambler who, in turn, was awarded judgment
against the hotel for almost the same amount.472
The Reynolds case was appealed, and the appeal was decided
after Famularo.473  The Reynolds appellate court (Reynolds II) was
less sympathetic to the gambler.  On appeal, Spigelman, C.J.,
stated bluntly:
Save in an extraordinary case, economic loss occasioned by gam-
bling should not be accepted to be a form of loss for which the
law permits recovery.  I make allowance for an extraordinary
case, without at the present time being able to conceive of any
such case. . . .  The interest sought to be protected is the avoid-
ance of a risk of loss of money through gambling.  That risk,
when it came to pass, was entirely occasioned by the Appellant’s
own conduct.  It is not an interest, which, in my opinion, the law
should protect.474
Powell, J., distinguished Famularo on the ground that in Famu-
laro there was no allegation of negligence.475  Rather, Famularo
involved misleading conduct in violation of the Trade Practices
Act and a breach of the Liquor Act.476  Additionally, Giles, J., also
writing for the appellate court in Reynolds II, stressed that the
casino owed no duty of care to the patron because it exercised no
control over him.477
One remarkable gambling debt case now before the courts is
that of Craig Rosendorff, who allegedly lost over four million dol-
lars (Austl.) betting on credit with the Western Australian Total-
isator Agency Board (“TAB”).478  In 1999, Rosendorff reportedly
sued the TAB, alleging that it had allowed him to use a private
betting room and place bets on credit, which he would then pay off
each Thursday.479  Rosendorff’s claim is reportedly based on the
470 Am. Express Int’l v. Famularo, No. DCC1516 BG-G1, slip op., at 37 (D.N.S.W. Feb.
19, 2001) (on file with Chapman Law Review).
471 Id. at 30-31.
472 Id. at 46.  The court ordered Famularo to pay American Express $88,300.77 and
costs, and for the hotel to pay Famularo $85,043.44 plus costs, including those incurred in
his suit against AMEX. Id. at 46-47.
473 Reynolds v. Katoomba RSL All Serv. Club Ltd., No. CA 41030/99 (N.S.W. Ct. App.
May 2, 2001), (LEXIS, International Materials, Australia, New South Wales Unreported
Judgments).
474 Id. at Spigelman, C.J. opinion.
475 Id. at Powell, J. opinion.
476 Id.
477 Id. at Giles, J. opinion.
478 Lawyers Discover Compulsive Gambling, ROLLING GOOD TIMES ONLINE, Feb. 12,
1999, at http://www.rgtonline.com/h-articles/newspage2/A3128.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2002).
479 Id.
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illegality of advancing credit for gambling purposes.480  Report-
edly, a significant issue in the case was whether Rosendorff would
have to prove that every one of the five hundred thousand bets
was made on credit, that no cash was advanced, and that bets
were not made from any accumulated winnings.481  Early in 2000,
the Western Australian Supreme Court reportedly held that
Rosendorff did not have to provide details on each and every bet.482
At oral argument, Justice Geoffrey Miller reportedly opined that if
Rosendorff were to be cross-examined on each bet, the trial could
take two years.483  This preliminary decision was reportedly cru-
cial to the continued viability of Rosendorff’s claim because in the
opinion of one lawyer who represents gamblers, “Gamblers have
notoriously poor memories when it comes to remembering what
was said or done and when.  They appear to live in a hazy and
unreal world where the facts are whatever is convenient for the
moment.”484
It is clear that gambling debts are enforceable in Australia.
The question of casino liability for problem gamblers, however, re-
mains uncertain given the conflicting decisions in Famularo,
Reynolds, and the current case involving Rosendorff, the issue of
casino liability still needs to be settled.
480 Id. (quoting attorney Kevin Dundo who claimed the TAB activity violated section 33
of the TAB Act).  Section 33 of the TAB Betting Act states:
The following provisions apply in relation to betting through the Board:
(a) the Board, or any of its officers, agents or employees shall not accept a bet
unless made––
(i) by the deposit of the amount of the bet in cash at a totalisator agency; or
(ii) by letter sent through the post or by telegram or telephone message re-
ceived at a totalisator agency,
in accordance with the provisions of this Act;
(b) the Board, or any of its officers, agents or employees shall not accept any bet
that is made by letter or by telegram or telephone message or any horse race
unless—
(i) the person making the bet has, before the beginning of the race meeting at
which the horse race is to be held, established with the Board in accor-
dance with this Act, a credit account sufficient to pay the amount of the bet
and has maintained the account up to the time of making the bet and the
bet is charged against that account; or
(ii) alternatively, in the case of a bet made by letter or telegram, the amount of
the bet is forwarded through the post with the letter or payment thereof is
arranged by telegram in accordance with this Act;
Totalisator Agency Board Betting Act, 1960, No. 50, § 33 (W. Austl.).
481 WA: Jeweller Allowed to Bet Millions on Credit, Court Told, AAP NEWSFEED, July
25, 2000.  TAB’s lawyer said, “the TAB kept no records of credit betting, since whether a
client paid cash when a bet was placed was not recorded.  Any records that were kept were
destroyed after eight weeks.” Id.
482 Id.; Mairi Barton, Claim on TAB Passes Hurdle, AUSTRALASIAN BUS. INTELLIGENCE,
Aug. 25, 2000 at 13.
483 WA: Jeweller Allowed to Bet Millions on Credit, Court Told, supra note 481.
484 Richard Brading, Gambling Litigation - The Last Word in Loss-Chasing, presented
at the Gambling Studies Conference (November 2000) (lecture notes on file with Chapman
Law Review).
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IV. AUSTRIA
Austria generally defines gambling and wagering contracts as
“contract[s] in which the hope of an uncertain advantage is prom-
ised and accepted.”485  The Austrian Civil Code distinguishes
seven types of gambling and wagering contracts.486  The code also
provides that the political laws of Austria determine what types of
games are permissible and which are forbidden.487  These political
laws also codify the manner in which those persons carrying on
forbidden games, or who cheat in games, are to be punished.488
Generally, debts incurred as a result of entering into wager-
ing and gambling contracts are not enforceable in court.489  This is
not to say that bets are non-binding on the parties who enter into
them.  Bets that are fair and permissible under the law are bind-
ing insofar as they are paid to or deposited with the winner.490
Bets that are won as a result of fraudulent behavior, however, are
null and void.491  Rescission, a common form of contract remedy,
normally available in Austrian contracts when “the value of the
property exchanged differs by more than one-half,” is not available
for gambling and wagering contracts.492
The Austrian Civil Code exempts several forms of gaming
contracts, subjecting them instead to the general law of contracts.
These include drawing lots to settle disputes,493 and state lotter-
ies.494  The code also includes several types of contracts that would
perhaps not traditionally be considered “gambling” or “wager-
ing.”495  Contracts of sale, and other contracts that involve the ex-
pectation of future, yet uncertain rights are classified as gambling
or wagering contracts.496  Annuities and insurance contracts are
covered under the code, and thus, considered a type of gambling or
wagering contract.497
In sum, Austrian laws seem to simultaneously embrace some
of the more traditional notions of gambling enforcement, such as
485 THE GENERAL CIVIL CODE OF AUSTRIA  § 1267 (Paul L. Baeck trans., Oceana Publi-
cations 1972) [hereinafter GENERAL CIVIL CODE].
486 The seven different types of gambling and wagering contracts are:  bets, gambling,
the drawing of lots, contracts of future sale, annuities, common maintenance contracts, and
insurance contracts.  Wilibald Posch, Austria, in 4 CONTRACTS 246 (Kluwer Law Int’l 1996).
487 GENERAL CIVIL CODE, supra note 485, § 1272.
488 Id.
489 Id. § 1271.
490 Id.
491 Id. § 1270.
492 Id. § 1268.
493 Id. § 1273.
494 Id. § 1274.
495 The civil code also governs “general maintenance contracts” which are now deemed
obsolete.  Posch, supra note 486, at 246.
496 GENERAL CIVIL CODE, supra note 485, §§ 1275-76. See also Posch, supra note 486,
at 246-47.
497 Posch, supra note 486, at 246-47.
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providing no legal method for enforcing gambling debts, yet is
unique because it includes types of contracts that are generally
not considered to be bets or wagers in other countries.  As is the
case in most other countries around the globe, in order to best un-
derstand Austria’s current gambling laws and attempt to predict
their future, one must keep a keen eye on the country’s political
climate.
V. BELGIUM
Belgian law generally regards a gaming debt as unenforce-
able because it is contrary to public policy and good manners.498  A
loser may not recover any monies paid under the law except when
fraud, deceit, or cheating is found on the part of the winner.499  In
1999, however, Belgian law was modified to allow the enforcement
of authorized gaming contracts.500  Authorized gaming includes
horse racing and licensed betting on the results of competitive
sports.501 The Belgian Civil Code retains the Roman law tradition
by providing for the enforceability of debts from games involving
arm exercise, foot, horse or chariot racing, tennis, and similar
games involving exercise and dexterity, provided that the enforc-
ing court does not find the debt excessive.502
Belgian case law concerning the enforcement of gaming debts
is extremely limited.503  As a general rule, Belgian courts will en-
force foreign judgments and apply foreign law only if they can do
so without violating Belgium’s international public policy.504  In-
ternational public policy encompasses domestic policies, which
embody ethical, political, or economic policies fundamental to
society.505
VI. BRAZIL
Brazilian law states that gambling debts are unenforceable.506
Additionally, any amount that has been voluntarily paid cannot
be recovered unless payment was procured through deceit, the
loser was a minor, or payment was prohibited by court order.507
498 Thibault Verbiest, The Enforceability of Gaming Debts Under Belgian Civil Law 2
(unpublished manuscript, on file with Chapman Law Review).
499 THE CONSTITUTION OF BELGIUM AND THE BELGIUM CIVIL CODE 334 (John H. Crabb
trans., Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1982).
500 Verbiest, supra note 498.
501 Id. at 3.
502 THE CONSTITUTION OF BELGIUM AND THE BELGIUM CIVIL CODE, supra note 499, at
334.
503 Verbiest, supra note 498, at 4.
504 Id. at 1.
505 Id.
506 C.C. art. 1477.
507 Id.
138 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 5:87
Furthermore, Brazilian law provides that loans for gambling pur-
poses are unenforceable.508  There are, however, exceptions to this
prohibition.  First, the prohibition does not extend to a third-party
purchaser acting in good faith.509  Second, the prevailing view
among Brazilian legal scholars is that gambling debts incurred le-
gally outside Brazil, in jurisdictions such as Nevada and New
Jersey, are enforceable.510  Third, the statutory language has been
interpreted to apply only to:
[C]redit granted at the actual moment of gaming and not either
before or after the act of betting.  Therefore, if the credit is
granted to the patron either before or after he gambles, but not
during his gambling, the resulting debt under this reasoning
would not be unenforceable pursuant to Article 1478 of the Bra-
zilian Civil Code.511
If a casino attempts to register a foreign judgment against a
Brazilian resident, “exequatur proceedings,” which are estab-
lished by the Supreme Court of Brazil, must be followed.512  The
casino must directly submit a petition, submit to a review of ser-
vice of process, and file a cause of action with one of the Brazilian
Supreme Court Justices in order to initiate an exequatur proceed-
ing.513  The enforceability of the debt is “subject to ‘public policy’
considerations (i.e. the ‘legality’ of the underlying obligation).”514
In order to evade high costs and the low probability of success as-
sociated with the exequatur proceeding process, an action based
on a negotiable instrument signed by a gambler to “a non-casino-
affiliated company” might prove to be a more viable alternative.515
The process applicable to negotiable instruments in most Latin
American countries, such as Brazil, is precise and clearly codified,
ultimately providing more certainty than the exequatur proceed-
ing process.
VII. CANADA
The legality of gambling and the enforcement of gambling
debts varies by province or territory,516 just as it does in the
United States.  In the four western provinces, the Statute of Anne
508 Id. art. 1478.
509 Thomas J. Skola, The Collection of Gaming Debts Outside the United States, at
http://www.poliakoff.com/publications/article_archive/collection_gaming_debts.htm (last
visited Jan. 28, 2002).
510 Id.
511 Id.
512 Id.
513 Id.
514 Id.
515 Id.
516 Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Maalouf, [1992] 88 D.L.R.4th 612, 614, available at
1992 D.L.R. LEXIS 1827.
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and the English Gaming Acts of 1835 and 1845, are currently “in
force as a result of the date of reception of English laws in
1870.”517  In other provinces, such as New Brunswick, however,
English statutes passed after 1660 “did not extend to the colony of
which New Brunswick formed a part unless there was some provi-
sion in them to that effect.”518  Yet in 1786, New Brunswick passed
legislation in the spirit of the Statute of Anne, which voided all
securities given for gaming, and allowed anyone “who lost more
than 20 shillings within 24 hours,” or at one meeting to sue for
lost monies within one month.519  Nevertheless, recent Canadian
cases have uniformly enforced gambling judgments obtained in
the United States.520
In Ontario, courts will enforce gambling debts legally in-
curred in foreign jurisdictions, so long as such enforcement does
not “violate conceptions of essential justice and morality.”521  In
Boardwalk Regency Corp. v. Maalouf,522 the court allowed the en-
forcement of a New Jersey judgment against a Toronto business-
man for nearly fifty thousand dollars (U.S.).523  The court
emphasized that the evidence overwhelmingly indicated that the
parties intended to be bound and governed by New Jersey law.524
The court then stated that the provisions of the Ontario Gaming
Act were irrelevant, except as an indication of the province’s pub-
lic policy.525  The court stressed that recent events, such as al-
lowing ten-dollar blackjack bets at the Canadian National
Exhibition in 1991, indicate that gambling is no longer considered
morally repugnant.526
517 Peter Bowal & Caroline Carrasco, Taking a Chance on it: The Legal Regulation of
Gambling, 22(2) LAW NOW, Nov. 1997, at 28-30.
518 Velensky v. Hache, [1981] 121 D.L.R.3d 747, 749, available at 1981 D.L.R. LEXIS
3466.
519 Id. at 751.
520 E.g., Horseshoe Club Operating Co. v. Bath, No. C954434, 1997 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS
155710, at *4 (B.C. S. Ct. May 9, 1997) (recognizing a Nevada gambling judgment, relying
on Moulis v. Owen, 1 K.B. 746 (1907), but stating that the English Gaming Act of 1845
would not have allowed an action based on the debt); Golden Nugget Las Vegas Corp. v.
Hooi, No. C912325, 1992 A.C.W.J.S. LEXIS 31446 (B.C. S. Ct. Apr. 8, 1992) (enforcing a
Nevada gambling judgment); MGM Grand Hotel, Inc., v. Kiani, No. 9703 09761, 1997
A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 160440 (Ont. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 1997) (holding that a Nevada gambling
judgment was enforceable rejecting the public policy defense).
521 Maalouf, 88 D.L.R.4th at 615 (Lacourciere, J., concurring).
522 Id. at 612.
523 Id. at 624.
524 Id. at 620.
525 Id.  Cf. Ontario Gaming Act, R.S.O. ch. 183, §1 (1980) (“Every . . . bill . . . the consid-
eration for which . . . is money . . . won by gaming . . . shall be deemed to have been . . .
drawn . . . for an illegal consideration.”); see also id. § 4 (gaming debts are not enforceable
in court).  Operating a common gaming house is a criminal offense pursuant to the Crimi-
nal Code, R.S.C. ch. C-46, §§ 197, 201(1) (1985) (Can.).
526 Maalouf, 88 D.L.R.4th at 623.  In addition, Judge Carthy favorably cited the rea-
soning of Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Golden, 203 N.E.2d 210, 212-13 (N.Y. 1964), con-
cerning public policy. Maalouf, 88 D.L.R.4th at 624.
140 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 5:87
Judge Lacourciere in a concurring opinion, and Judge Arbour,
in dissent, both used public policy, and the morality of gambling,
to support their opposing conclusions.527  In supporting the major-
ity’s decision, Judge Lacourciere argued that Canada should not
shelter gamblers who run up debts in other countries; Canadian
morality required debtors, even gambling debtors, to fulfill their
obligations.528  On the other hand, Judge Arbour stressed the so-
cial costs associated with gambling, its connection to crime, and
the immorality of gambling.529  Judge Arbor further noted that the
New Jersey activities, if conducted in Ontario, would be crimi-
nal.530 In essence, by permitting “recovery of a debt outside Onta-
rio under circumstance that would be criminal under the same
circumstances in Ontario . . . Ontario public policy . . . [must] yield
to foreign law.”531
In 1993, a Toronto lawyer lost over twenty thousand dollars
(U.S.) at an Atlantic City casino.532  When his countercheck was
dishonored, the casino sued him in the Ontario Court of Justice.533
The defendant argued that the Maalouf decision should be distin-
guished, as Maalouf involved registering a foreign judgment,
whereas in his case the casino commenced direct litigation in the
Canadian court.534  The trial judge found the distinction unwar-
ranted.535  The judge opined that a person who gambles legally in
a foreign county, with the intention of using the laws of Canada to
avoid the debt, “richly deserves the courts contempt.”536  The judge
further stated that if Ontario’s Gaming Act could be used as the
debtor requested, it would “spawn an evil more heinous than the
one, ostensibly, it was intended to guard against.”537  The judge
determined that the Gaming Act, should be narrowly construed,
as societal opinion on gaming had changed, evidenced by the fact
that Ontario would soon be opening its own casinos.538
527 Maalouf, 88 D.L.R.4th at 614-16 (Lacourciere, J., concurring), 627-32 (Arbour, J.,
dissenting).
528 Id. at 618.
529 Id. at 625-31.
530 Id. at 631.
531 Id.
532 Atlantic City Showboat, Inc. v. Smith, No. 92-CU-48786, 1993 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS
47765, at *1 (Ont. Gen. Div. July 6, 1993).
533 Id. at *2.
534 Id. at *2-3.
535 Id. at *3.
536 Id. at *4.
537 Id.
538 Id. at *3.  In 1999, Ontario gaming laws were amended to permit casinos to extend
credit to a player who filled out an exhaustive credit file.  Ontario Gaming Control Act,
R.R.O. ch. 385/99, § 29(1)-(4), (11), (12) (1999).  A player must also sign a countercheck to
the casino, which is then deposited if the credit is not repaid within thirty banking days.
Id.
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Quebec courts reached a similar result concerning the en-
forcement of a New Jersey judgment in Auerbach v. Resorts Inter-
national Hotel, Inc.539  In that case, the appellate court affirmed a
trial court’s decision to enforce a debt, notwithstanding the fact
that Quebec laws would have barred enforcement.540  The court
stressed that the action would have been unenforceable under the
civil code of lower Canada.541  The court likewise affirmed the New
Jersey judgment, as “it would be quite contrary to public order if
Quebec became a refuge for gamblers who could keep winnings
from a gaming or betting activity yet refuse to pay debts they had
previously contracted and acknowledged by signing some cheque
or credit note.”542
In Quebec, an unusual, and apparently not illegal, method of
providing credit for gambling has developed at the Montreal Ca-
sino, where loan sharks will lend money to players in casino
restrooms.543  Apparently, lending at ten percent for twenty-four
hours is not a criminal offense in Quebec, and loan sharks only
provide gamblers with casino tokens, not cash.544
Alberta will also enforce gambling judgments from the United
States.  In MGM Hotel Inc. v. Kiani,545 a casino asked the court to
enforce a Nevada default judgment.546  Adopting the position
taken in Maalouf, the Master granted summary judgment in favor
of the casino, explaining that public policy could no longer bar re-
lief, as gambling had become an accepted “indoor sport” in Al-
berta.547  The result may have been different, however, if the
Nevada casino had attempted to enforce a gambling debt directly
in an Alberta court, without having first obtained a default
judgment.
In Financial Collection Agencies Ltd. v. Edenoste,548 a collec-
tion agency that was assigned the gambler’s nineteen thousand
539 [1991] 89 D.L.R.4th 688, available at 1991 D.L.R. LEXIS 2159.
540 Id. at 688.
541 Id. at 690; see R.S.Q. ch. XVI, art. 2630 (2000).
Art. 2630. Where gaming and wagering contracts are not expressly authorized by
law, the winning party may not exact payment of the debt and the losing party
may not recover the sum paid.
The losing party may recover the sum paid, however, in cases of fraud or trickery
or where the losing party is a minor or a person of full age who is protected or not
endowed with reason.
Id.
542 Auerbach, 89 D.L.R.4th at 693.
543 Lynn Moore, Loan Sharks Hunt for Prey in Quebec Casinos: Some Money-Lenders
have been Banned from Gambling Sites, but Lending Cash is Not Illegal, VANCOUVER SUN,
Jan. 20, 1997, at B10.
544 Id.
545 No. 9703 09761, 1997 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 16440 (Ont. Ct. App. Nov. 6, 1997).
546 Id. at *1.
547 Id. at *12.
548 No. 9203 23830, 1994 A.C.W.S.J. LEXIS 71704 (Alta. Q.B. June 7, 1994).
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dollar gambling debt sued the gambler’s estate.549  The Master de-
nied the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, and referred
the matter for trial based on the affirmative defense of cham-
perty.550  The court then explained why this collection agency
agreement was atypical:
[I]n the normal course of business a collection agency would ar-
range to have legal proceedings commenced, and would look to
the client to reimburse it for an amount disbursed in having the
matter sued to judgment. Thereafter the collection agency
would be entitled to some agreed commission on funds it actu-
ally collected. That is a totally different kind of arrangement
from the one that was concluded between Gold Nugget and
F.C.A. here, where F.C.A. took over the Gold Nugget claim en-
tirely, undertook to be itself responsible for legal expenses, and
agreed to pay Gold Nugget a certain percentage of funds col-
lected. That sort of an arrangement appears to fit within the
definition of a champertous agreement, and appears to involve
officious intermeddling.551
In Manitoba, the English Gaming Act of 1835 was held by the
Court of Appeals to be enforceable under Manitoban law, notwith-
standing various constitutional challenges.552  In Red River Forest
Products Inc. v. Ferguson,553 the respondent purchased a two hun-
dred thousand dollar promissory note to satisfy a gambling
debt.554  The plaintiff argued that the Gaming Act of 1835 is not
valid because it was not translated into both official languages, as
is required by the Manitoba Act of 1870.555  The trial court con-
cluded that, while the Gaming Act is valid in Manitoba, the note
was given for illegal consideration, and was therefore unenforce-
able.556  The appellate court agreed, stating:
The purpose of the Gaming Act is an endeavor to regulate and
prevent excessive gambling, and the primary objects of the stat-
ute are to declare every agreement, note, bill and other forms of
security, the consideration for which is money won at gaming, to
have been made or given for an illegal consideration, and to en-
able the loser of a wager to recover it back after it has been paid
to the winner. It is not legislation the purpose and object of
549 Id. at *2-4.
550 Id. at *22.  The court cited Black’s Law Dictionary to define champerty as:  “a bar-
gain by a stranger with a party to a suit, by which such third person undertakes to carry on
the litigation at his own cost and risk in consideration of receiving, if successful, a part of
the proceeds sought to be recovered.” Id. at *12.
551 Id. at *18.
552 Red River Forest Prod., Inc. v. Ferguson, [1992] 98 D.L.R.4th 697, 698, available at
1992 D.L.R. LEXIS 2363.
553 Id.
554 Id. at 700.
555 Id. at 699.
556 Id.
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which is directly concerned with bills of exchange or promissory
notes.557
Ultimately, the appellate court rejected the plaintiff’s appeal.558
VIII. FRANCE
French law concerning gaming and betting has evolved “from
moral prohibition, through tolerance, to modern organization as a
collective activity bringing income to the state.”559  The drafters of
the French Civil Code reluctantly welcomed this new “modern or-
ganization.”560  The drafters’ hostility concerning gaming is evi-
dent from the tone of the Civil Code, and from the existence of the
high standard that is required before any action for recovery will
succeed.561  The Civil Code states, “The law does not allow an ac-
tion for a debt at play or for the payment of a wager.”562  Addition-
ally, the Civil Code denies relief for any recovery of paid wagers
providing, “In no case can the loser recover what he has volunta-
rily paid, unless there  . . . [has] been on the part of the winner foul
play, fraud, or cheating.”563
Consistent with the harsh standards of the Civil Code, the
Cour de Cassation564 has historically held that checks remitted to
an authorized gambling casino are void, and therefore, the loser
may still refuse to pay even if he wrote a check to the winner.565
However, the Cour de Cassation has recently reversed its prior
line of cases.  Currently, checks remitted to authorized gambling
casinos are valid, and thus, lenders have recourse against losers
for the payment of the debts.566  These recent decisions make it
apparent that “modern organization” of gaming is slowly achiev-
ing acceptance in France, although the Civil Code, with its harsh
tone and standards, is still in effect to this day.
IX. GERMANY
German casinos, like those of many other European nations,
cannot extend credit.567  German law concerning gambling debts is
557 Id. at 717.
558 Id. at 699.
559 J. Schmidt-Szalewski, France, in 2 CONTRACTS 242 (Kluwer Law Int’l Supp. 25 Oct.
1999).
560 Id.
561 Id. See also C. CIV. §§ 1965-67, available at http://www.napoleonseries.org/refer-
ence/political/code/book3/title12.cfm.
562 C. CIV. § 1965.
563 Id. § 1967.
564 Cour de Cassation refers to the highest court of ordinary jurisdiction in France.
565 Schmidt-Szalewski, supra note 559, at 242.
566 Id.
567 Compare Joseph Kelly et al., Germany, in INTERNATIONAL CASINO LAW 379
(Anthony N. Cabot et al. eds., 3d ed. 1999) [hereinafter INT’L CASINO LAW], with  Magdolna
Kocsis, Hungary, in INT’L CASINO LAW supra, at 432 (“According to the Hungarian regula-
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clear—they are unenforceable and if the losing party pays the
debt, he may not recover any monies.568  The relevant statute
states:
[Non-binding obligation]
(1) No obligation is created by gaming or betting. What has been
given by reason of the gaming or betting may not be demanded
back on the ground that no obligation existed.
(2) These provisions apply also to an agreement whereby the los-
ing party, for the purpose of satisfying a gaming debt or a bet,
incurs an obligation towards the other party, particularly an ac-
knowledgment of the debt.569
Moreover, German courts will not enforce a futures contract, be-
cause futures contracts are considered to be gaming contracts.570
The courts have also refused to register foreign gambling
judgments.  In Societe Generale Alsacienne de Banque SA v.
Koestler,571 the European Court of Justice held that Germany did
not have to recognize gambling debts, even if they were legal in
the country where the debt arose, so long as German law was ap-
plied in a nondiscriminatory manner.572  In Koestler, the plaintiff
was a French bank, which, on the instructions of the defendant,
placed futures orders on the Paris stock exchange.573  The defen-
dant, a German resident, incurred a large overdraft with the bank
as a result of the losses he incurred.574  The court held that the
obligations entered into by the defendant must be treated in the
same way as debts arising out of a wagering contract.575  The court
further found that because Germany barred recovery by legal ac-
tion of certain debts, such as debts arising out of wagering con-
tracts, this cause was not actionable in court, even though it may
have been actionable in the member state in which it occurred.576
In LG Mo¨nchengladbach,577 a German court refused to enforce
a gambling debt judgment from the U.S. District Court for Ne-
vada.578  The German court suggested that the litigation should
tions, casinos cannot grant credit to the gamblers.”), and Malgorzata Rogowicz-Angierman,
Poland, in INT’L CASINO LAW, supra, at 454 (“In Poland casinos are not allowed to grant
credits to their clients.  Any claims with regard to the games are resolved by a casino man-
ager, and in case of any further questions, by an appropriate court.”).
568 1 B.S. MARKESINI ET AL., THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND RESTITUTION: A COMPARATIVE
INTRODUCTION 726-27 (Clarendon Press 1997).
569 § 762 BGB.  German law allows for the enforcement of a lottery or raffle contract,
only if it is approved by the government. Id. § 763.
570 Id. § 764.
571 1978 E.C.R. 1971.
572 Id. at 1981.
573 Id. at 1978.
574 Id.
575 Id. at 1979.
576 Id. at 1981.
577 Landgericht Mo¨nchengladbach, 34 O 87/93, Aug. 6, 1994, at 1374.
578 Id.
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have been commenced directly in Germany where the bettor could
use the defense of compulsive gambling.579  In conclusion, the
court stated that it would be against fundamental principles of the
German legal system to allow an entity to profit from a person’s
gambling problem.580
X. GREECE
Greece prohibits both the enforcement of gambling debts, and
recovery actions by gamblers for sums already paid.581  However,
like many European nations, Greek law creates an exception for
recovery of gambling-related sums paid on account of fraud by the
winner.582  According to Article 844 of the Civil Code, gambling
debts do not constitute an enforceable obligation;583 there are,
however, exceptions.  Greek legislation has made gambling debts
related to certain permitted forms of gaming, such as football
pools, enforceable.584 Additionally, legal casinos may be exempted
from the general prohibition against the enforcement of gambling
debts if the debts have been legally verified.585  The Greek govern-
ment has reportedly begun to require casinos to “face some heavy
house rules including forcing customers to show their tax returns
as proof that they can afford to play” after the suicide of a busi-
nessman who ran up gambling debts in the amount of two billion
drachma.586
XI. HONG KONG
Hong Kong decisions have determined that enforcement of a
gambling debt incurred legally in another jurisdiction does not vi-
olate Hong Kong public policy.  In Wong Hon v. Sheraton Desert
Inn Corp.,587 the defendant issued three checks for nearly $2.5 mil-
lion (U.S.) in return for twenty markers from the plaintiff’s Las
Vegas casinos.588 The defendant’s checks were dishonored.589  The
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s judgment against the
579 Id.
580 Id.
581 Michael P. Stathopoulos, Hellas, in 3 CONTRACTS 1, 31 (Kluwer Law & Taxation
supp. 5 Sept. 1994).
582 Id. at 241.
583 John Andrews Anagnostaras & Harry Melvani, Greece, in INT’L CASINO LAW, supra
note 567, at 422.
584 Stathopoulos, supra note 581, at 241.
585 Anagnostaras & Melvani, supra note 583, at 422 (citing casino Law No. 2206/1994
(art. 3.9)).
586 Equivalent to about £4.3 million. European Business: Can’t Pay, Won’t Pay,
Mustn’t Bet, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Mar. 4, 1998, at 29, available at 1998 WL
3001355.
587 1995 HKC LEXIS 719 (Ct. App. July 14, 1995).
588 Id. at *6.
589 Id.
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defendant.590  Specifically, the court disregarded the defendant’s
contention that the markers were not a loan.591  The court noted
that the transaction was valid pursuant to Nevada law and En-
glish authority.592  Thus, there was no violation of the Statute of
Anne, which is incorporated into Hong Kong law.593  Lower courts
have similarly concluded that loans to gamblers, in jurisdictions
where they were legal, do not bar enforcement of the debt in Hong
Kong.  In its decision in Wong Hon,594 for example, the trial court
opined that Hong Kong law should not dictate the behavior of
those outside of the nation.595
In Las Vegas Corporation v. Lo Yuk Leung,596 a Nevada casino
sued a Hong Kong citizen over unpaid gambling markers totaling
nearly three million dollars (U.S.).597  The debtor sought a stay of
the casino’s suit on the grounds that Nevada, rather than Hong
Kong, was the proper venue for the action.598  The court deter-
mined that this argument had no merit and was merely a delaying
tactic.599  When this argument was unsuccessful, the debtor then
utilized three defenses in response to the casino’s summary judg-
ment motion.600  These defenses included:  there was no valid
credit instrument, the Nevada law was unconstitutional, and that
recovery would be against public policy.601
The judge dismissed any evidentiary conflicts as to whether
the markers constituted valid credit instruments pursuant to Ne-
vada law.602  On the constitutionality issue, after hearing experts
on both sides, the judge determined that the Nevada law was not
in violation of the U.S. Constitution.603  Perhaps the most interest-
ing aspect was the judge’s analysis of whether enforcement of the
Nevada gambling debt would violate Hong Kong’s public policy.
While the court stated that gambling is generally unlawful in
Hong Kong, it noted that there was some legal, and even govern-
ment-sponsored, gambling.604  Thus, it concluded that public pol-
icy did not make gambling per se illegal.605
590 Id. at *17.
591 Id. at *8.
592 Id. at *11, 14.
593 Id. at *12-14.
594 1995 HKCU LEXIS 95 (S. Ct. H.K. Mar. 10, 1995).
595 Id. at *4.
596 1997 HKCU LEXIS 959 (High Ct. H.K.1 Nov. 28, 1997).
597 Id. at *1.
598 Id. at *1-2.
599 Id. at *7-8.
600 Las Vegas Hilton, Corp. v. Lo Yek Leung, 1998 HKCU LEXIS 40, at *1 (High Ct.
H.K. Admin. 1 Jan. 19, 1998).
601 Id.
602 Id. at *7-8.
603 Id. at *13.
604 Id. at *18-19.
605 Id. at *19.
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The defendant also argued that the debt should not be en-
forced because he was a compulsive gambler.606  The court rejected
this defense, explaining that persons afflicted with many types of
addictions are held responsible for their actions, and businesses
do not have a duty to protect their patrons from themselves.607  In
conclusion, the judge stated that it would be extremely arrogant to
refuse to enforce debts that were legally incurred in another
nation.608
XII. ISRAEL
Israeli law states that contracts are void if illegal, immoral, or
against public policy.609  The Israeli courts do not consider gam-
bling to be against a law, morality, or public policy.610  Israeli law
has legalized some forms of gambling, including its national lot-
tery.611  Thus, so long as a gambling debt was legally incurred, it is
enforceable.612  However, Israeli law does not allow the enforce-
ment of an illegal gambling debt.613  Israel has retained the skill
versus chance distinction from Roman law.  The Israeli courts de-
fine unenforceable gambling contracts as “a gambling, lottery or
betting contract under which a party may win some benefit, the
winning being dependent on fate, guess-work or chance, rather
than on understanding or ability, and which is not regulated or
permitted by law.”614
Israeli courts have determined that foreign gambling debt
judgments are not per se against Israeli public policy.615  Should
an Israeli citizen incur a gambling debt in a foreign jurisdiction, it
will be enforced so long as the final judgment is from a country
that will enforce an Israeli judgment.616  Application for enforce-
ment in Israel must be made no later than five years after the
date of the foreign judgment, and the debtor must have had a rea-
sonable opportunity to present his arguments.617  Nevertheless,
the courts retain a narrow residual discretion to refuse enforce-
ment of foreign judgments.618
606 Id. at *20.
607 Id. at *20-21.
608 Id. at *26.
609 The Contracts (General Part) Law, 1973, 27 L.S.I. 122, (1972-73).
610 Id.
611 Avaraham Katz-Oz, Words From the Chairman, at http://www.pais.co.il/new_pais/
serve/Templates/english/words.asp?p_folderID=212 (last visited Mar. 23, 2002).
612 27 L.S.I. 122.
613 Id.
614 Id.
615 Memorandum from Gil White, Attorney, Herzog, Fox & Neeman, to Joseph Kelly,
Professor of Business Law, SUNY College Buffalo (Nov. 14, 2001) (on file with Chapman
Law Review).
616 Id.
617 Id.
618 Id.
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XIII. ITALY
Italian law does not allow an action to enforce debts arising
from gambling or wagers, even if the debt is incurred while gam-
bling legally.619  Italy has retained the Roman law tradition.  Wa-
gers on sporting events and racing, by both participants and
spectators, are exempt from the non-actionability rule.620  Courts
may reject or reduce claims for winnings on sporting events and
races if the court considers the amount of the wager to be
excessive.621
Italian law also does not allow the extension of credit for the
purpose of gambling because such loans are against good
morals.622  Additionally, recovery actions are not permitted.623  If
bets are placed on state lotteries or contests sponsored by the
state, a winner may file an action to claim winnings from the
state.624
XIV. JAPAN
Gambling is prohibited in Japan, and winners may not en-
force gambling claims against losers because such claims are
against public policy.625  However, a gambler who loses may be
able to recover his or her losses under a theory of restitution be-
cause the benefactor of the losses obtained the wagers
illegitimately.626
Japan has a policy of recognizing and enforcing final judg-
ments of foreign courts.627  Ordinarily, foreign judgments that are
contrary to public policy are not enforced in Japan, but this rule is
not applied to transactional cases.628  Therefore, money judgments
from foreign courts will be enforced even if the judgment is based
on “gambling or other immoral transactions.”629  It is reported that
this rule allowed a casino to recover a gambling debt in a Japa-
nese court when the defendant did not raise the public policy
issue.630
619 C.C. 1933, translated in THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE 132 (Oceana Publ’n, Ind. Aug.
2001).
620 C.C. 1934, translated in THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 619.
621 Id.
622 P.H. MONATERI ET AL., Italy, in 3 CONTRACTS 126 (Kluwer Law Int’l Supp. 22 Jan.
1999).
623 Id.
624 Id.
625 HIROSHI ODA, JAPANESE LAW 206 (Butterworths 1992).
626 Id.
627 5 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN at 5-60 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 2001).
628 Id. at 5-64.
629 Id.
630 Id. at 5-65 (citing Las Vegas v. Chin, 794 HANREI TIMES 246 (Tokyo Dist. Ct. Dec.
16, 1991)).
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It must be cautioned that Japan’s laws on conflicting judg-
ments may lead to harsh results for parties seeking to enforce
gambling debts through foreign court judgments.  A Japanese
debtor may sue in Japanese court to have his or her debt declared
unenforceable as against public policy.631  If a foreign judgment is
rendered prior to the Japanese court’s judgment, the foreign judg-
ment will be enforced as res judicata.632  However, if the party
does not start an action to enforce the foreign court judgment prior
to a Japanese court rendering a conflicting judgment, the Japa-
nese judgment will protect the debtor from enforcement.633
XV. MALAYSIA
Malaysian courts have evidenced a willingness to enforce
gambling debts incurred legally in another jurisdiction.  In As-
pinall Curzon Ltd. v. Khoo Teng Hock,634 a gambler purchased
chips at a licensed casino with a check and when he lost, he
stopped payment on the check.635  The casino sued him for the
amount of the check in a British court, and then sought to register
the British judgment in Singapore.636  The defendant argued that
the judgment should be unenforceable because it is against public
policy in Great Britain.637
In dicta, the judge expressed criticism of the defendant’s pub-
lic policy defense stating, “[W]hat is public policy? . . . It is a very
unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know
where it will carry you.  It may lead you from the sound law.  It is
never argued at all but only when other points fail.”638  The judge
determined that the law of the country in which the contract was
formed governs, in this case, Malaysia.639  The court then held that
the British judgment was enforceable because the contract was
lawful under Malaysian law and did not violate Malaysian public
policy.640
In another recent case, it was reported that a businessman,
Datuk Sng Chee Hua, sought to set aside a British judgment for
631 Id. at 5-59.
632 Id.  However, the Japanese concept of res judicata is narrower than the American
concept. Res judicata in Japan is “strictly limited to the immediate parties and the matters
expressly contained in the formal disposition.” Id.  Therefore, Japanese law does not recog-
nize the concept of collateral estoppel. Id.
633 Id. at 5-69.
634 1991 MLJ LEXIS 147 (High Ct. Kuala Lumpur Feb. 18, 1991).
635 Id. at *5.  Malaysian law permits the licensing of gaming houses. Id. at *9-10, *13.
636 Id. at *4-5.
637 Id. at *10-11.
638 Id. at *11-13 (citations omitted).
639 Id. at *10 (citing Saxby v. Fulton, 2 K.B. 208 (1909)).
640 Id. at *10, 13.
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three hundred thousand pounds.641  The gambler had reportedly
wagered at Grosvenor Casino, a licensed London entity, and his
check was dishonored.642  The High Court reportedly rejected his
argument that the enforcement of the debt was against public pol-
icy.643  The debtor reportedly withdrew his appeal and, in a settle-
ment recorded before the High Court, agreed to make installment
payments over a stipulated period.644
XVI. MEXICO
Mexican law does not permit the enforcement of a debt based
on “forbidden gaming proceeds.”645  The Mexican Civil Code con-
tains recovery provisions that are similar to the Statute of Anne.
Under the Code, “Persons, or their heirs, who voluntarily pay a
debt originating from a forbidden game are entitled to demand the
return of fifty (50%) percent of what was paid.  The remaining fifty
(50%) percent shall not remain with the winner but shall be deliv-
ered to public charity.”646  This rule of unenforceability also serves
to bar the enforcement of gambling debts converted into other
forms, which would otherwise constitute a legally enforceable obli-
gation.647  Gaming debt losses from games that are not prohibited
are enforceable “as long as the amount of the loss does not exceed
one-twentieth of [the debtor’s] assets.  A cause of action provided
under this Article shall be barred within thirty days.”648  Addition-
ally, otherwise invalid “method[s] of chance” create legally recog-
nized obligations when used to sell a dispute or divide a common
asset.649
XVII. THE NETHERLANDS
Modern Dutch law regards gaming and wagering contracts as
unenforceable.650  A loser may only claim restitution in instances
641 Businessman’s 300,000 Pound Sterling Foreign Gambling Debt Settled, MALAY.
GEN. NEWS, Oct. 31, 2000.
642 Id.
643 Id.
644 RM1.7m Settlement Over Gambling Debt Recorded, NEW STRAITS TIMES (Malay.),
Nov. 1, 2000, at 15.
645 C.C.D.F. art. 2764, translated in MEXICAN CIVIL CODE 631 (Abraham Eckstein &
Enrique Zepeda Trujillo trans., West 1996) (Article 2764  “There is no cause of action under
the law for a claim of forbidden gaming proceeds.  The Penal Code shall set forth those
games which are prohibited.”).
646 C.C.D.F. art. 2765, translated in MEXICAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 645.
647 C.C.D.F. art. 2768, translated in MEXICAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 645.
648 C.C.D.F. art. 2767, translated in MEXICAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 645 (Article 2767
“Whoever loses in a game or bet that is not forbidden shall be civilly obligated to pay, as
long as the among of the loss does not exceed one-twentieth (1/20) of his assets.  A cause of
action provided under this Article shall be barred within thirty (30) days.”).
649 C.C.D.F. art. 2771, translated in MEXICAN CIVIL CODE, supra note 645.
650 Arthur S. Hartkamp & Marianne M. M. Tillema, Netherlands, in 3 CONTRACTS 1,
167 (Kluwer Law & Taxation supp. 4 June 1994).
2002] Between Public Policy and Practicality 151
of fraud.651  Reminiscent of Roman law, a wagering debt incurred
while betting on “games suitable for physical exercise”652 is en-
forceable, but a judge may reduce or dismiss the claim if the
amount is excessive.653  Dutch law will, however, enforce a loan
agreement, even if the lender was fully aware that the borrower
intended to use the money for gambling.654  Enforcement is only
denied to a direct gambling contract; any other agreements con-
nected to gambling contracts will be enforced,655 but Dutch law
prohibits credit gaming.656  Despite the liberal enforcement rule
for third party loans, the conversion of a direct gaming debt into a
secondary obligation will not change the unenforceable nature of
the debt.657  Any person who does not violate house rules must be
permitted entry into Dutch casinos.658  Individuals may, however,
voluntarily exclude themselves from all casinos nationwide.659
XVIII. RUSSIA
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, Russian law has been in
a state of transition and uncertainty in many areas.  It has been
reported that Western creditors avoid suits in Russia partly “be-
cause of an unfavorable line of Arbitrazh court cases.”660  Although
the Russian Civil Code prohibits the enforcement of gambling
debts,661 licensed gambling is legal.662  However, gambling claims
based on fraud or extortion do receive legal protection.663
In a recent case, the Moscow Arbitrazh Court was faced with
a contract in which one bank would purchase foreign currency
from the other at a set price, and the other bank would later
purchase the same quantity of currency at the Moscow Interbank
Currency Exchange rate on a later date.664  The court concluded
651 Id. (citing Civil Code art. 7A:1828).
652 Id. (citing Civil Code art. 7A:1825).
653 Id. (citing Civil Code art. 7A:1826).
654 Id. (citing Civil Code art. 7A:1827).
655 Id.
656 Chris Hoogendoorn, The Netherlands, in INT’L CASINO LAW, supra note 567, at 451
(“Law does not allow credit gaming . . . .”).
657 Hartkamp & Tillema, supra note 650 (citing Civil Code art. 7A:1827).
658 Hoogendoorn, supra note 656.
659 Id.
660 ‘Gaming’ Decisions May Bar Recovery in Russia on Bank Forward Contracts, RUSS.
& COMMW. BUS. L. REP., vol. 9 No. 15 (Nov. 18, 1998).  The Arbitrazh Courts include the
lower Moscow Arbitrazh Court and Appellate Division, the reviewing Federal Arbitrazh
Courts, and the Supreme Arbitrazh Court, which is the court of last resort.  Clifford Chance
LLP, Gaming Decision, at http://www.jura.uni-passau.de/fakultaet/lehrstuehle/Fincke/
cliff2.htm (last updated Sept. 30, 1998).
661 GK RF art. 1062, translated in, CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION 481 (Wil-
liam E. Butler trans., 2d ed. 1997); Clifford Chance LLP, supra note 660.
662 Id.
663 Id.
664 Id.
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that this foreign currency transaction “represented a bet,”665 as
the obligations of one party depended upon a condition outside the
parties’ control.666  Therefore, the court held that the claims aris-
ing from the transactions were unenforceable under Article 1062
of the Civil Code of the Russian Federation.
However, the Federal Arbitrazh Court of the Moscow Circuit
has reached the opposite conclusion on similar facts.667  Given that
Russian courts are not obligated to follow precedent,668 uncer-
tainty remains for Western creditors seeking to enforce questiona-
ble debts.  What is clear, nonetheless, is that Russian law is
hostile to the enforcement of gambling debts.669
XIX. SINGAPORE
In Singapore, courts still follow British law, including the
progeny of the Statute of Anne.  Most important is section 18 of the
Gaming Act of 1845, as incorporated into Singapore law in section
6 of its Civil Law Act.670  In Las Vegas Hilton Corporation v. Khoo
Teng Hock Sunny,671 the plaintiff sued the defendant in Singapore
to enforce gambling debts of over one million dollars (U.S.) from
unpaid markers.672  The court was concerned with three issues:
where the contract to extend credit was made; whether Nevada or
Singapore law should govern the contract; and if Nevada law gov-
erned, whether the contract was enforceable in Singapore.673
The court had little difficulty establishing that almost all
credit discussions occurred in Nevada where the casino was lo-
cated.674  The court then applied the test of the “closest and most
real connection” to determine the appropriate law to be applied.675
The court concluded that Nevada law applied.676  The court also
stated that gambling was not per se illegal in Singapore.677  It
665 Id.
666 Id.
667 GK RF art. 1062, translated in CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note
661.
668 Clifford Chance LLP, supra note 660.
669 GK RF art. 1062, translated in CIVIL CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, supra note
661.
670 Sun Cruises Ltd. v. Overseas Union Bank Ltd., 1999 S.L.R. LEXIS 182, at *6 (High
Ct. May 31, 1999) (citing Civil Law Act Cap. 43, § 6 (1994)).  Neither the Gaming Act, 1710,
nor the Gaming Act, 1835, are part of the current law of Singapore. Id. at *13.
671 1996 S.L.R. LEXIS 468 (High Ct. Aug. 3, 1996).  For an analysis of public policy
issues in this case, see Yeo Tiong Min, Comment, Are Loans For International Gambling
Against Public Policy?: Las Vegas Hilton Corporation t/a Las Vegas Hilton v. Khoo Teng
Hock Sunny, 1 SING. J. OF INT’L & COMP. L. 593 (1997).
672 1996 S.L.R. LEXIS at *14.
673 Id. at *7.
674 Id. at *28.
675 Id. at *29.
676 Id. at *30.
677 Id. at *31.
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noted that although gambling contracts were void, there was no
law actually banning gambling in all forms.678
The court held that the transaction in question was not in vio-
lation of section 6 of the Civil Law Act because it was a loan.679
The court cited to Halsbury’s Laws of England as authority for the
argument that loans are not governed by the prohibition.680  The
court held that when a gambling debt is incurred in a jurisdiction
where gambling is legal, the debt is enforceable.681
The decision in Las Vegas Hilton has been confined to its facts
by four subsequent Singapore decisions: Star Cruise Services v.
Overseas Union Bank Ltd.,682 Sun Cruises Ltd. v. Overseas Union
Bank Ltd.,683 Star City Pty. Ltd. v. Tan Hong Woon,684 and Quek
Chiau Beng v. Phua Swee Pah Jimmy.685
In Star Cruise Services, the plaintiff unsuccessfully sought to
enforce a nine hundred thousand dollar (Sing.) debt.  The defen-
dant counterclaimed for $9.1 million (Sing.), which he had paid
the plaintiffs.686  Several issues were presented to the court by the
facts of the case, resulting in a forty-three-page decision.687  The
court determined that the fact that the gambling losses were
called loans in the transaction documents was irrelevant, and
merely a matter of semantics.688  The gambling debts had been in-
curred on gambling cruises offered by Panamanian ships that had
no destination.689  The court noted that Panamanian law was sub-
stantially similar to Singapore law regarding gambling debts,690
but determined that Singapore law should be applied.691
In exhaustive detail, a significant part of the opinion ex-
plained why the relevant British statute, section 18 of the Gaming
678 Id. at *40.
679 Id. at *33.
680 Id. (citing 8 HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND ¶ 607 (Butterworths 4th Ed. 1996)).
681 Id. at *34.
682 1999 S.L.R. LEXIS 181 (High Ct. Apr. 30, 1999).
683 1999 S.L.R. LEXIS 182 (High Ct. May 31, 1999).
684 2001 S.L.R. 95 (High Ct. May 21, 2001), aff’d, Star City Pty. Ltd. v. Tan Hong
Woon, No. 600093 of 2001, slip op. (Ct. App. Feb. 25, 2002) (on file with Chapman Law
Review).
685 2000 S.L.R. LEXIS 97 (High Ct. Nov. 24, 2000).
686 Star Cruise Serv., 1999 S.L.R. LEXIS 181, at *17.
687 Id.
688 Id. at *21.
689 Id. at *95-96.
690 Id. at *71.  The court stated:
In Panama the core provision is embodied in art 1490 of the Civil Code.  The mate-
rial part of it provides that ‘The law does not provide cause of action to recover
what has been won in a game involving luck, stake at cards, or chance but the
losing party may not repeat (sic) what he has voluntarily paid.’  It means that
although gaming is lawful, a gaming debt cannot be enforced and if paid cannot
ordinarily be recovered.  This is not surprising because of the way gaming transac-
tions have been viewed almost universally.
Id. at *82-83 (alteration in original).
691 Id. at *85.
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Act of 1845, made gambling debts unenforceable for lack of consid-
eration.692  The court concluded that the 1845 Act, as interpreted
by the courts, also barred derivative contract litigation because it
was merely an attempt to circumvent the law.693  The court
stressed the importance of looking at the underlying purpose of a
contract to determine whether it was a gaming contract.694  It
stated that if a debtor is given a loan and complete control of the
funds, even if the loaning party knows it will be used for gam-
bling, the loan will not be treated as a gambling debt.695  However,
if a lawyer attempts to make a gambling debt appear to be a legiti-
mate loan, the court determined that the lawyer would be subject
to discipline.696 The court explained that section 6 does not pro-
hibit gambling, nor does it prohibit the payment of gambling
debts—gambling debts are debts of honor that should be paid—
instead it merely prohibits the use of the courts to enforce such
debts.697
In Sun Cruises Ltd. v. Overseas Union Bank Ltd.,698 the court
once again refused to enforce a five hundred thousand dollar
(Sing.) gambling debt.699  While the defendants pled various de-
fenses, they were only successful on the argument based on sec-
tion 6 of the Civil Law Act.700  The court held that the five hundred
thousand dollar (Sing.) cashier’s order, given in exchange for gam-
ing debts, was null and void, and the action on the cashier’s check
was an attempt to recover gambling winnings and was therefore
void.701
Almost immediately after the Star Cruise and Sun Cruises
cases were decided, a debtor who lost $360,000 (U.S.) to a Las
Vegas casino sought to reopen a judgment against him that had
been decided on the basis of the earlier Las Vegas Hilton deci-
sion.702  In Poh Soon Kiat v. Hotel Ramada of Nevada t [sol] v.
Tropicana Resort & Casino,703 the court recognized the Star Cruise
and Sun Cruises decisions, but concluded that, even if it agreed
with these decisions, it did not have the power to set aside the
earlier judgment.704
692 Id. at *32.
693 Id. at *49-50.
694 Id. at *59.
695 Id. at *69.
696 Id. at *72.
697 Id. at *81 (citing section 6 as the Singapore equivalent of the Gaming Act of 1845).
698 1999 S.L.R. LEXIS 182 (High Ct. May 31, 1999).
699 Id. at *5.
700 Id. at *13.
701 Id. at *19.
702 1999 SLR LEXIS 216, at *6-7 (High Ct. June 30, 1999).
703 Id.
704 Id. at *8, 11, 18.
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In Quek Chiau Beng, a gambler lost $160,000 (Sing.) at an
Australian casino.705  The court, the same that had earlier adjudi-
cated the Sun Cruises and Star Cruise cases, held that the claims
were forbidden by Singapore law and could not be heard.706  The
court emphasized that, unlike the allegations in Las Vegas Hilton
Corp., the allegation in this case contained no indication that the
transaction was a loan.707  Finally, the court held that no action
could have been brought in Australia, and the plaintiff, a junket
operator, had no standing to litigate.708
In Star City Pty. Ltd., the plaintiff sought to collect $194,840
(Austl.) from the defendant for, what the casino characterized as,
unpaid gaming loans.709  The defendant traveled at the plaintiff’s
expense to a Sydney casino, and exchanged five house checks,
each worth fifty thousand dollars (Austl.), for chip purchase
vouchers that he then exchanged for chips.710  In deciding the ap-
plicable law, the court concluded that section 5(2) of the Civil Law
Act of Singapore was controlling.711  The court determined that
section 5(2) prohibits actions to recover gambling winnings, acting
as a procedural bar to the plaintiff’s action.712  The court noted
that the only real issue was whether the plaintiff sought recovery
of gambling winnings.713  The court then analyzed British cases in
order to illustrate that British courts were hostile to attempts to
circumvent English anti-gaming laws.714  The court concluded
there was no essential difference when a check was exchanged for
chip purchase vouchers instead of for chips.715  In its conclusion,
the court cited a law review article that argued section 5 was not
an attempt to ban immoral behavior, but an attempt to avoid the
waste of judicial resources on such behavior.716
Early attempts to enforce gambling debts in Singapore were
successful.  However, modern Singapore courts have been uni-
formly unwilling to enforce those debts, regardless of how the un-
derlying transactions were structured.
705 2000 S.L.R. LEXIS 97 (High Ct. Nov. 24, 2000).
706 Id. at *17.
707 Id. at *14-15.
708 Id. at *17.
709 2001 S.L.R. LEXIS 95, *7 (High Ct. May 21, 2001).
710 Id. at *6.
711 Id. at *26.
712 Id. at *12-13.
713 Id. at *13.
714 Id. at *13-23.
715 Id. at *23.
716 Id. at *26 (citing Yeo Tiong Min, Loans for Extraterritorial Gambling and the
Proper Law: Loh Chee Song v Liew Yong Chian, 1998 SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 421, at 428-29).
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XX. SOUTH AFRICA
South African law is a mixture of Roman-Dutch, with influ-
ences from the British common law.717  Gambling debts were his-
torically considered naturalis obligatio, or debts of honor, which
were legally unenforceable.718  However, legislation, such as the
National Gambling Act 33 of 1996 and the Lotteries Act 57 of
1997, has legalized gaming nationwide.719  Subsequently, each of
the provinces has also passed legislation making gaming debts le-
gal and enforceable.720  One issue that the courts have struggled
with is whether a legal gambling debt in one province can be en-
forced in another province.721
In Sea Point Racing CC v. Pierre de Villiers Berrange N.O.,722
the South African courts were faced with the question of whether
a gambling debt from one province could be enforced in a sister
province.723  The plaintiff, who was a Cape Town-based book-
maker, was suing the estate of a decedent from another province
for nearly four million rand in gambling debts.724  A court a quo
considered the issue of whether or not it could enforce the debt,
and applied the Western Cape Gambling and Racing Law No. 4 of
717 See generally WILLE’S PRINCIPLES OF SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 20-21, 27, 35-37 (Dale
Hutchinson et al. eds., 8th ed. 1991).
718 F. Willem Grosheide, The Gentleman’s Agreement in Legal Theory and in Modern
Practice – the Dutch Civil Law Perspective (1998), at http://www.library.uu.nl/publarchief/
jb/congres/01809180/15/b6.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
719 BRSA § 13(1)(f) of National Gambling Act 33 of 1996; BRSA § 14(2)(i) of Lotteries
Act 57 of 1997.
720 See Marita Carnelley, Case Note, Enforcement of Lawfully Incurred Gambling
Debts, DE REBUS 57 (May 2001).
All these Acts contain a provision that any gambling debt lawfully incurred is en-
forceable in a court of law, notwithstanding provisions of the common law or any
other law to the contrary (Lotteries Act (s 65), National Gambling Act (s 18), Gam-
bling and Betting Act 5 of 1997 (Eastern Cape) (s 87); Free State Gambling and
Racing Act 6 of 1996 (s 95); Gambling and Betting Act (Gnuteng) 4 of 1995 (s 75);
KwaZulu-Natal Gambling Act 10 of 1996 (s 92); Mpumalanga Casino and Gaming
Act 5 of 1995 (s 87); Northern Cape Gambling and Racing Act 5 of 1996 (s 93(1));
Northern Province Casino and Gaming Act 4 of 1996 (s 91); North West Casino,
Gambling and Betting Act 13 of 1994 (s 90(1)) and the Western Cape Casino and
Racing Law 4 of 1996 (s 79(1)).
Id.
721 Section 18 makes “gambling debts incurred by any person in the course of any gam-
bling activity regulated by law . . . enforceable in a court of law.”  Gaming Ass’n of South
Africa (Kwa-Zulu Natal) v. Premier of Kwa-Zulu Natal, 1997 (4) SALR 494, 501 (Natal
Provincial).
722 No. AR 774/99, slip op. (High Ct. Kwazulu-Natal Provincial Aug. 1, 2000) (on file
with Chapman Law Review).
The learned judge in the court a quo found that the Western Cape Legislation only
applied within the territory of that province and could not affect the law as it
applies to this province.  He found that the KwaZulu-Natal legislation could only
regulate gambling within this province and could not purport to regulate gambling
transactions elsewhere.
Id. at 3.
723 Id. at 2.
724 Id.
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1996, which states:  “Any debt lawfully incurred by a person . . . in
the course of gambling shall . . . be enforceable in a court of law.”725
However, that court found that the Western Cape Gambling Law
could not affect the law that must be applied in the KwaZulu-Na-
tal Province.  The court then referred to the common law, which
states that “a gambling debt is an obligation which is valid but not
recoverable through the courts.”726  That court dismissed the ap-
plication with costs.727  On appeal, the court pointed out that the
lower court overlooked section 18 of the National Gambling Act.728
Thereafter, the Kwazulu-Natal Division of the High Court of
South Africa reversed the trial court, holding that gambling debts
are enforceable throughout South Africa pursuant to the National
Gambling Act.729  Judgment was granted in favor of the
plaintiff.730
XXI. SPAIN
Traditionally, Article 1798 of the Spanish Civil Code did not
allow gamblers to pursue an action to recover winnings or lost wa-
gers unless there was fraud, or the gambler was a minor or inca-
pacitated.731  However, in 1995, the Supreme Court of Spain
recognized a significant exception:  if a gaming contract is entered
legally, winnings are recoverable.732  The court said that enforcing
legal gambling debts was consistent with the Spanish Constitu-
tion’s principle of assuring the conduct of legal businesses.733
Article 1801 of the Spanish Civil Code requires a loser to pay
legal gambling debts.734  However, courts have discretion to either
dismiss the suit or reduce the debt to the “extent it exceeds the
wages of a prudent administrator.”735  Spain will enforce gambling
debts incurred in other countries if there is a treaty or judicial
cooperation agreement between Spain and the country where the
debt accrued.736
725 Id. (citing § 79(1) of Western Cape Gambling and Racing Law 4 of 1996).
726 Id. at 3.
727 Id.
728 Id.
729 Id. at 4.
730 Id.
731 C.C. art. 1798, translated in CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN 420-21 (Julio Romanach, Jr.
trans., Lawrence Publ’g Co. 1978).
732 E-mail from Ana Lemos, Co-founder and Former CEO of the Spanish Center for
Legal Studies on Gaming, to Joseph Kelly, Professor of Business Law, SUNY College Buf-
falo (Sept. 4, 2001) (on file with Chapman Law Review).
733 Id.
734 “One who loses in a game or bet that is not prohibited is civilly liable.” C.C. art
1801, translated in CIVIL CODE OF SPAIN, supra note 731, at 421.
735 Id.
736 Lemos, supra note 732.
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XXII. SWITZERLAND
Switzerland traditionally did not allow the enforcement of
debts, bills of exchange, or promissory notes that arose from gam-
bling debts.737  Even debts that were transferred to a third party
in good faith were not enforceable.738  Voluntary payments of gam-
bling debts could be recovered if the payee acted unfairly when the
debt was made, or if the gambler attempted to recover his or her
money prior to actually placing a bet.739  Switzerland also would
not enforce foreign gambling debt judgments that creditors at-
tempted to register in Swiss courts.740
It appears that the Swiss attitude toward enforcement of
gambling debts is changing, as more casinos open in the country.
In 1998, Switzerland amended its Code of Obligations so that
debts legally incurred in authorized gaming establishments
within Switzerland are enforceable.741  Also, in late 2000, a Swiss
court reportedly enforced a 1998 British judicial decision requir-
ing a Swiss gambler to pay almost £770,000.742
737 CO art 513, translated in 1 SWISS CODE OF OBLIGATIONS 174 (Swiss-Am. Chamber of
Comm. 1990)
738 CO art 514, translated in 1 SWISS CODE OF OBLIGATIONS, supra note 379.
739 Id.
740 See Yves P. Piantino, Recognition and Enforcement of Money Judgments Between
the United States and Switzerland: An Analysis of the Legal Requirements and Case Law,
17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 91, 119 n.157 (1997).
741 CO art. 515a(D) (2001).
742 Sperrfrist 1200 Schonzeit fuer Zocker ist Vorbei Bundesgericht Laesst Betreibung
eines Spielers zu, Schweizerische Depeschenagentur AG (SDA), Dec. 1, 2000.
